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The rain falls down on last year’s man, 
an hour has gone by 
and he has not moved his hand. 
But everything will happen if he only gives the word; 
the lovers will rise up 
and the mountains touch the ground. 
 
Leonard Cohen 
Last year’s man
  
  
 
  
  
   
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This Thesis presents three studies on gender issues in accounting, governance and 
risk aversion. Chapter one analyzes the effects of the introduction of gender quotas 
on boards of directors on the monitoring role of boards. Chapter two studies 
whether males and females have different preferences over risk than their male 
counterparts in the particular setting of a multiple choice exam. Finally, chapter 
three studies the determinants—at firm level—of hiring female board members in 
a context characterized by increasing social pressure toward gender diversity on 
boards of directors.  
 
Esta Tesis presenta tres estudios sobre temas de género en contabilidad, gobierno 
corporativo y aversión al riesgo. En el primer capítulo se estudia el efecto de 
implementar cuotas de género en consejos de dirección sobre el monitoreo que 
realizan dichos consejos. En el segundo capítulo se estudia si las mujeres presentan 
diferencias en sus preferencias sobre riesgo respecto a los hombres en un  contexto 
particular, un examen de opción múltiple. Finalmente, el tercer capítulo estudia los 
determinantes de contratar mujeres como miembros del consejo en un contexto de 
fuertes presiones sociales para incrementar la diversidad de género en los consejos. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Fostering gender diversity in corporate governance has become a central issue for 
policy makers in Europe. Regulators have tackled this issue using different 
approaches. France, Germany, Italy and Norway, among others, have issued 
regulations to impose a minimum proportion of females on boards (quotas). Other 
countries, like Spain and the United Kingdom, have set policies or issued 
recommendations to foster gender diversity in corporate governance. The 
European Union’s commissioners approved in 2012 a plan forcing companies 
listed in the EU to reserve at least 40 percent of their board seats for women by 
2020. The arguments used by regulators to justify quotas range from an apparent 
discrimination in the access of females to top positions, to the underutilization of a 
pool of highly skilled individuals. Regulators argue that quotas can reverse the 
pervasive effect of discrimination and underutilization of highly talented 
individuals. 
However, there is no clear consensus among scholars about the 
consequences of affirmative action programs. Some authors argue that affirmative 
action programs lead to sub optimal solutions to contracting processes, including 
the hiring of less qualified individuals. On the other hand, other scholars provide 
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evidence that quotas increase women’s educational achievements and their 
participation in top positions, without hindering efficiency. As an argument for 
fostering gender diversity on corporate governance, regulators claim that females 
have different skills than males, and these different skills can produce positive 
spillovers at the firm level. However, scholars also disagree about the extent of 
such gender differences in preferences, in particular risk aversion. Some authors 
even argue that the observed difficulties in the access to top positions are 
associated with gender differences in risk aversion; moreover, it is not necessarily 
the case that, among individuals occupying top positions like boards 
memberships, individuals present different attitudes toward risk, conditional on 
their gender. 
I address the aforementioned conflicting results in this Doctoral Thesis. 
More specifically, this thesis presents three studies on the dynamic relationships 
between gender, corporate governance regulations, financial reporting and risk 
aversion. In chapter one, “Accounting quality effects of imposing gender quotas on 
boards of directors” (with Juan Manuel García Lara and José Penalva Zuasti), we 
study the consequences over the monitoring exerted by boards of directors of 
imposing a minimum proportion of female members on boards. To that end, we 
use as a natural experiment the Norwegian Gender Quota. This Quota—issued as 
voluntary in 2003— imposed a minimum 40 percent of females on Norwegian 
boards of directors. Using a hand-collected data base of 4,000 observations, we 
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provide evidence that, after the Quota, Norwegian boards are on average younger 
and less executive experienced. These younger, less experience boards are less 
likely to constrain earnings management practices, as we observe a positive and 
significant relationship between board changes due to the Quota and abnormal 
levels of the accrual component of earnings. In addition, we provide evidence that 
the effect of the Quota seems to be clustered around the years when board changes 
are taking place, and disappear thereafter. This evidence is consistent with the 
argument that the monitoring role of the boards could be affected either by the lack 
of experience of incoming board members due to the Quota, or by a disruption on 
the board’s work, as a consequence of the massive entry of new board members in 
a short lapse of time. 
In chapter two, “Gender differences in risk aversion: Evidence from a multiple 
choice exam of accounting students” (with Juan Manuel García Lara and Lluís 
Santamaría Sánchez), we study gender differences on preferences over risk. We 
also analyze whether these differences can be mitigated by personal characteristics, 
as some scholars argue that observed differences can be originated either on 
cultural factors—the nurture argument—or natural factors—the nature argument. 
To test these questions we take advantage of a natural experiment. We use a 
multiple choice exam, common to first year students of Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid. In this exam, wrong questions are penalized, whereas blank questions are 
not. Hence, we use as a proxy for risk aversion the number of blank questions left 
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in the exam. Also, to control for student’s skills, we collect information about 
students’ scores in the university entry exam and their grade point average 
(average score of the courses that they took until that moment at the university). 
Moreover, we use personal information of the students to control for factors 
associated with observed differences in risk aversion. Our results provide evidence 
that, in our setting, females tend to be more risk averse than males, and this 
difference is exacerbated in situations perceived as riskier (when the student is 
close to either failing or passing the exam). However, this difference disappears 
among the more skilled students (those with higher scores in the university entry 
exam, GPA, or among those in the more demanding degrees). Our results support 
a line of research that suggest that gender differences in risk aversion do not apply 
to sophisticated individuals. 
Finally, in the last chapter of my thesis, “Determinants of early compliance with 
gender quotas on boards: Evidence from the Netherlands”, I study what firm-level 
factors lead to non-compliance with social pressures toward gender diversity. To 
that end I use a Dutch sample. In the Netherlands, the period 2003 – 2012 was 
characterized by an increasing social pressure to augment the participation of 
women on corporate governance, a pressure that lead eventually to the proposal of 
a Gender Quota in 2009. The Netherlands provide an intermediate case from an 
unregulated setting, where the inclusion of women on boards is completely 
discretionary, and settings with stringent affirmative action programs, where 
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penalization for firms that do not comply with gender-parity regulations is 
liquidation. This intermediate situation allows heterogeneity in firms’ responses to 
regulations that, in turn, can be linked to certain firms’ characteristics. My study 
provides evidence that bigger and profitable firms are more likely to include 
female board members, whereas older firms, with long tenured executives are less 
likely to include females on the executive board. These results can improve the 
understanding of the dynamics, at the firm level, of fulfilling regulations related to 
gender diversity on corporate governance. 
These three studies provide evidence of the relationship between regulation 
of corporate governance and corporate’s outcomes. Firstly, I provide evidence that 
although Quotas can increase the proportion of females on boards, regulators 
should be also aware of the short term negative consequences for firm’s 
stakeholders, in particular related to the quality of financial reporting. Secondly, I 
provide evidence of the existence of gender differences in risk aversion, and that 
these differences disappear among the most skilled individuals. Finally, I 
contribute to the identification of the determinants of compliance with regulations 
aimed at increasing gender diversity on a setting where the penalization for 
delinquent firms is low. Overall, this Thesis provides an analysis of different 
problems associated with affirmative action programs, corporate governance, 
financial reporting and risk aversion, and the consequences of the interaction of 
these elements.  
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This Thesis is structured as follows: chapter one presents the study 
“Accounting quality effects of imposing gender quotas on boards of directors”; chapter 
two presents the study “Gender differences in risk aversion: Evidence from a multiple 
choice exam of accounting students”; chapter three presents the study “Determinants of 
early compliance with gender quotas on boards: Evidence from the Netherlands”; finally, 
chapter four presents the bibliography used in this Thesis. 
I would like to acknowledge the guidance, encouragement and support of 
my supervisors and co-authors, Juan Manuel García Lara and José Penalva Zuasti. 
I would like to thank also Lluís Santamaría Sánchez, co-author of the second 
chapter. I appreciated comments and suggestions of Dina Aburous, Beatriz García 
Osma and Catherine Shakespeare at different stages of this research. This Thesis 
has been benefited from financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Economy 
and Competition (ECO2013-48328-C3-3-P, ECO2010-19314), Fundación Ramón 
Areces and the International Mobility Program, UC3M. All errors are mine. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Accounting quality effects of imposing 
gender quotas on boards of directors 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Gender quotas on boards of directors are an increasingly important issue for 
regulators around the world. At a national level, several countries have plans or 
have set objectives regarding the participation of women on corporate governance 
(Deloitte [2013]). Norway was the first country to implement a law imposing a 
minimum percentage (40 percent) of women on boards. Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain have issued corporate legislations including policies to 
increase gender diversity on boards of directors. In November 2012, the European 
Union’s Commissioners approved a plan forcing companies listed in the EU to 
reserve at least 40 percent of their board seats for women by 2020. However, 
several European countries oppose the forced incorporation of female board 
members, and suggest that gender policies on corporate governance should be 
tackled differently. In the United States there is no explicit regulation regarding 
gender diversity on boards. This heterogeneity in the regulation of gender 
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diversity on boards may be associated with the existing paucity of empirical 
evidence on the effects of quotas. 
The consequences of imposing quotas—aimed to redress discrimination 
against women and minority groups—are unclear. Some scholars believe these 
actions improve the participation of the targeted social group on highly 
competitive jobs, as politics (Beaman et al. [2009]; Balafoutas and Sutter [2012]). 
However, other authors have negative opinions of the effects of quotas over 
economic outcomes (Holzer and Neumark [1999a]; [1999b]; [2000]; Mollerstrom 
[2012]). 
We contribute to this debate by analyzing the effects of the introduction of 
quotas on the monitoring role of boards of directors. To this end, we use the 
Norwegian “Rules for Gender Representation” quota (thereafter Gender Quota) 
issued as voluntary in 2003, which imposes a minimum female representation of 40 
percent on boards of directors. The Gender Quota became compulsory in 2006—
with a two years transition—after the failure of voluntary compliance. The penalty 
for delinquent firms was liquidation. By 2008, 40 percent of Norwegian Public 
Limited Companies’ board seats were occupied by women. We can safely conclude 
that, between 2005 and 2008, many Norwegian firms were forced to conduct 
sometimes drastic changes in the composition of their main corporate governance 
body. We hypothesize that those drastic changes on board composition affected 
the level of monitoring exerted by Norwegian boards. 
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This natural experiment has already been the subject of research. Ahern and 
Dittmar [2012] provide evidence that there is a negative relation between the 
increase in the percentage of women on boards due to the Gender Quota and the 
value of Norwegian firms, measured by Tobin’s Q. In a related study, Bøhren and 
Staubo [2014] find evidence suggesting that firms affected by the Gender Quota 
tend to switch legal forms to avoid the consequences of the legislation. Finally, 
Matsa and Miller [2013] find that firms affected by the Gender Quota undertake 
fewer workforce reductions, and that this leads to increases in labor costs and 
employment levels and to decreases in short term profits. Overall, these papers 
document that the Gender Quota, at least in the short run, had a negative influence 
on firm’s value and corporate governance. 
We extend these studies and analyze the effect of the Gender Quota on the 
monitoring role of corporate boards. To do so, we examine whether the 
implementation of the quota affected firms’ accounting policies, and, in particular, 
earnings management. We first explore the profiles of board members using a 
hand-collected panel of personal attributes and characteristics of 4,000 Norwegian 
board members during the 2002 – 2010 period. We find that Norwegian firms 
replaced male board members with females in an attempt to fulfill the quota, 
instead of increasing board size. We find evidence that after the Gender Quota, 
new female board members are qualitatively different from exiting men. On 
average, these new female board members are younger, have lower executive 
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experience, and have more education compared to the exiting male board 
members that they replace. Consequently, after the Gender Quota, Norwegian 
firms’ boards are qualitatively different from boards before the quota. We posit 
that these new, qualitatively different boards have lower monitoring skills on 
average than boards before the quota. Our evidence of differences in the 
qualitative attributes of directors in the pre- and post-quota periods is consistent 
with Ahern and Dittmar [2012] results. 
As an outcome of the monitoring skills of the board, we explore the quality 
of accounting numbers. As a proxy for the quality of accounting numbers, we use 
unsigned abnormal accruals. We assume that the level of abnormal accruals is an 
outcome of the monitoring process, where better monitoring leads to a lower level 
of abnormal accruals. In our setting, firms forced to appoint more new female 
directors to comply with the Gender Quota requirements could, in fact, reduce the 
monitoring ability of the board over management. Consistent with our hypothesis 
that personal attributes and characteristics of new directors may hinder the 
monitoring ability of the board, we find that, after the Quota, companies that incur 
in higher costs to comply with the requirements of the quota have higher levels of 
abnormal accruals. Our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for known 
sources of earnings management. 
In a second set of tests, we explore the effects of the quota over time. Firms 
can, over time, find adequate substitutes to highly skilled board members that are 
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13 
replaced as a result of the quota. Also, board members in office appointed after the 
quota may obtain the adequate skills to become good monitors. Our results 
indicate that during the last years of our sample, the difference in earnings 
management between groups disappear, consistent with the notion that the quota 
may only have negative effects during the period where higher board changes 
occur. The results are consistent with the evidence in Ahern and Dittmar [2012] 
and Bøhren and Staubo [2014] that the Gender Quota was costly in terms of firm 
value for shareholders of Norwegian companies. Nevertheless, this effect seems to 
be short-lived, and clustered around the period where board changes where the 
highest. Finally, we study the association between abnormal accruals and board 
characteristics. As described before, newly appointed female board members are 
qualitatively different than exiting males. Consistent with this, we find that 
earnings management is associated with differences in the professional 
characteristics of the directors (like prior experience as CEO or CFO) and not with 
the gender of the directors. 
Overall, our results provide evidence consistent with the endogenous 
relation between firm’s characteristics and its optimal corporate governance 
structure (Adams et al. [2010]), and with the importance of the board of directors 
as a monitoring mechanism. Also, our results are consistent with the negative 
consequences of quotas on the hiring of skilled workers, at least in the short run, as 
suggested by Holzer and Neumark [1999a, 1999b]. Since European governments 
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14 
are currently considering imposing gender quotas, our results indicate that such 
affirmative actions could have negative effects, though possibly only in the short 
run, in terms of corporate governance and, consequently, on shareholders’ 
interests. Finally, prior research analyzing the relation between gender and 
accounting quality (Barua et al. [2010]; Srinidhi et al. [2011]; Abbott et al. [2012]; 
Francis et al. [2014]) focuses on the US, a setting where the selection of executives 
and directors is not regulated. Our research contributes to this literature by 
exploring a different setting, where the selection of female board members is 
regulated and a minimum percentage of female directors is imposed externally, 
through regulation. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section two reviews the literature on 
affirmative action and quotas; it also describes the Norwegian Gender Quota and 
presents our research hypothesis; Section three explains the sample construction 
and the research design; Section four presents the main empirical results, and 
robustness checks; Section five studies the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and board characteristics; finally, Section six concludes. 
 
1.2 Literature review, background and hypothesis development 
1.2.1 Prior evidence on the effects of affirmative action programs 
Affirmative action programs aim to improve the status of minorities and women in 
the labor market and other areas (Holzer and Neumark [2000]). A common type of 
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affirmative action is the imposition of gender or minorities quotas. Although 
widely proposed in political arenas, there is no clear consensus among scholars 
about the effects and consequences of affirmative action. In particular, proponents 
of gender quotas call for the historical underrepresentation of women in high 
profile jobs. This difficulty for women to access top positions is, generally, 
accepted in the literature. Bilimoria and Piderit [1994] document sex-bias toward 
board committee memberships, since women are more likely to be appointed to 
public relation committees rather than executive committees. Westphal and Stern 
[2006], [2007] provide evidence of women facing different types of discrimination 
in accessing board positions. Moreover, evidence of the preference of men over 
women with the same abilities for top positions is also found in other areas, such 
as in biomedical research (Wennerås and Wold [1997]) or in leading symphony 
orchestras (Goldin and Rouse [2000]). 
The imposition of gender quotas guarantees an increase in the participation 
of women in high profile jobs, breaking the so-called glass ceiling from above. The 
glass ceiling is defined as an invisible barrier that limits the access of females to top 
positions in the corporate world. Proponents of quotas suggest that although the 
presence of women in managerial and public service positions is increasing over 
time, once they reach a certain position in the company (the glass ceiling) it seems 
impossible for them to move further upward (Cotter et al. [2001]). As the presence 
of women in top positions is fostered by quotas, other women may reach top 
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positions by themselves. These new entrants may benefit from the observed labor 
outcomes of women who accessed highly competitive positions previously 
through quotas, which may eliminate biases in social norms (and stereotypes) 
regarding women’s capabilities. Women who access top positions through quotas 
may also become role models for other women. In a study of female quotas for 
local governments in India, Beaman et al. [2009] provide evidence consistent with 
these benefits of quotas in the long run, and Balafoutas and Sutter [2012], using a 
lab experiment, also provide evidence consistent with these positive effects of 
quotas. 
An expected additional positive effect of an increased female participation 
in top managerial positions (either enforced through quotas or not) is reduced 
discrimination practices against female workers at the lower echelons of the 
organization. In particular, Tate and Yang [2014], who focus on an unregulated 
environment, without quotas, show that firms with more women in the top 
decision-making processes implement more female friendly policies that decrease 
the gender pay gap between male and females with the same occupation in the 
same firm. 
On the other hand, opponents to gender quotas argue that quotas may lead 
to the hiring of less qualified workers. In this sense, Welch [1976], Lundberg [1991] 
and Coate and Loury [1993] conclude that the imposition of quotas leads to 
suboptimal solutions on contracting problems. Holzer and Neumark [1999a] find 
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that the use of affirmative action programs leads to the hiring of minorities or 
female employees who are less qualified, and   documents uncooperative behavior 
in groups formed with quota-based selection rules. Directly analyzing the 
Norwegian case, Bertrand et al. [2014, p.1] conclude that “the reform had very little 
discernable impact on women in business”, beyond those that were appointed 
because of the quota. Finally, the use of quotas for public employment is banned in 
several US states, which suggests that a number of legislators have a negative 
opinion about the effects of quotas. 
1.2.2 The Norwegian gender quota for boards of directors 
Even though many countries are considering legislative changes to foster the 
presence of women on boards, Norway was the first country enforcing a minimum 
ratio of women in the board of directors of public limited liabilities companies—or 
ASA in Norwegian, which stands for Allmennaksjeselskap—. Through the “Rules for 
Gender Representation” quota the Norwegian government imposed a minimum 
female representation of 40 percent on boards of directors for public limited 
liabilities firms. 
The first informal announcement of the quota was made on February 22nd, 
2002. This public announcement was highly unanticipated, and was made public 
after a meeting between a journalist and Ansgar Gabrielsen, Minister of Trade and 
Industry. In December 2003—almost two years after the informal announcement of 
the quota—the Norwegian Parliament passed an amendment to the Public Limited 
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Companies Act, establishing a demand for gender balance in the companies’ 
boards. The agreement between the Norwegian government and the private sector 
was that if the companies achieved a minimum gender representation on boards of 
40 percent voluntarily before July 2005 there would be no penalties for delinquent 
firms. However, by July 2005, only 13.1 percent of the affected firms achieved the 
desired female representation: overall, only 16 percent of board members were 
women, a percentage lower than the targeted 40 percent. 
After voluntary compliance failed, the rules requiring a minimum 40 
percent female representation on boards of public limited liabilities companies 
became compulsory on January 1st 2006, and companies had two years (up to 
January 1st 2008) to comply with the law. Also, all new listed companies after 
January 1st 2006 had to fulfill the gender quota to be registered in the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. The penalty for noncompliance was the liquidation of the delinquent 
company. By April 2008—six years after the informal announcement of the 
quota—all Norwegian public limited companies fulfilled the Gender Quota. Figure 
1.1 presents the increase of female presence on Norwegian boards for the firms in 
our sample during the period 2002 – 2010. 
Norwegian companies’ managers and owners complied with the Gender 
Quota with significant resistance. In particular, they complaint about the lack of 
qualified female candidates (Storvik and Teigen [2010]). Ahern and Dittmar [2012] 
provide early evidence supporting the quota opponents’ claim that, at least in the 
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short run, there was a lack of qualified candidates. Ahern and Dittmar [2012] find 
that new female board members are younger and have less experience as executive 
managers or owner/partnership experience than retained and exiting male board 
members. In contrast, new female board members have more formal education. 
Similarly, Storvik [2011] conducted a survey on Norwegian board members at the 
beginning of 2009. Among the surveyed board members who answered that the 
Gender Quota had a negative effect on the board’s work after the reform, their 
main reason for arguing a negative effect is that new female board members lack 
important skills and insight. Our data about board members’ personal attributes 
provide evidence consistent with that of Storvik [2011] and Ahern and Dittmar 
[2012].  
1.2.3 The effect of the quota on the quality of accounting numbers 
Our main research hypothesis combines the evidence that the Norwegian pre and 
post-Gender Quota boards are qualitatively different (Ahern and Dittmar [2012]), 
with the evidence of affirmative action programs leading to the hiring of 
individuals that are not the best suited for the type of work (Holzer and Neumark 
[1999a]). 
Regarding who is better suited to monitor the financial reporting decisions 
of top managers, prior research shows that the influence of directors on the 
financial reporting system depends upon whether the directors have prior 
experience in preparing or auditing financial statements. There is evidence that 
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firms with a larger number of directors with accounting expertise are less likely to 
present accounting irregularities (Badolato et al. [2014]), that firms with more 
financial experts in the audit committee suffer less internal control problems 
(Krishnan [2005]), and that accounting expertise in the audit committee is linked to 
more conservatism accounting numbers (Krishnan and Visvanathan [2008]) and 
improved accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al. [2010]; Krishnan et al. [2011]). Also, 
capital market participants value the presence of directors with accounting 
backgrounds in audit committees (DeFond et al. [2005]), and even prior research 
uses directly accounting expertise in the audit committee as a proxy for accounting 
quality (Engel et al. [2010]). There is also prior evidence that accounting/financial 
literacy (education) is not enough, and that prior experience is key to ensuring 
financial reporting quality (McDaniel et al. [2002]). 
However, firms that had to made large changes to their board because of the 
quota will find it difficult to find candidates to board directorships with the proper 
characteristics. This lack of adequate candidates was in fact one of the main 
criticisms to the quota (Storvik [2011]), and the results in Ahern and Dittmar [2012] 
are in line with Norwegian boards after the law having younger and less 
experienced members. We expect that this lower experience will hinder the 
monitoring capability of boards of directors of the most affected firms. This lower 
monitoring capability will, in turn, permit managers to engage in earnings 
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management activities that will not be detected by the board. Given this, our main 
hypothesis as follows: 
H: Firms forced to perform greater changes due to the Norwegian Gender Quota are 
more likely to suffer from a reduction in the monitoring ability of the board of directors. 
This reduced monitoring ability is expected to lead to increased earnings management 
practices. 
 
1.3 Sample and research design 
1.3.1 Sample 
To test our hypothesis, we hand collect demographic and professional information 
about Norwegian CEOs and board members from several sources. For each board 
member and CEO we obtain the name, gender, and birth date from the Norwegian 
Business Register. We also record the nationality, education, prior experience as a 
CEO, current occupation and year elected to the board to compute tenure.1 
We collect board and CEO information for companies that fulfill three 
conditions: (1) their financial statements information, needed to run our tests, is 
available on the Bureau Van Dijk’s Osiris database from 2000 until 2010; (2) they 
were public limited liabilities companies—the organizational form affected by the 
quota—at the time of the informal announcement by the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (2002); and (3) they were listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange before the 
passage of the stricter version of the Gender Quota in 2006. These three conditions 
                                                          
1 An extensive description of each item collected is provided in Appendix A. 
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yield a sample of more than 4,000 person-year observations, for an unbalanced 
panel of 81 firms: we have data on 8 firms through 2008, 4 firms through 2009 and 
69 through 2010.2 Although all public limited liability companies are affected by 
the Quota, we focus on listed companies to test our hypothesis. We do this for two 
reasons. First, while the quota is mandatory for both types of firms, non-listed 
firms find it much easier and less costly to change legal status to avoid complying 
with the quota. However, delisting can be quite costly, and, therefore, one might 
think that the quota law is actually only compulsory for listed firms. Consistent 
with this argument, Bøhren and Staubo [2014] show that a large percentage of 
private firms affected by the quota law changed their legal status. Second, financial 
reporting incentives for listed and unlisted firms vary substantially (Burgstahler et 
al. [2006]).  
CEOs and board members’ biographical information comes from annual 
reports. If any of the information for a given board member is missing from the 
annual report, we check either other firms’ reports or look for alternative sources 
of bio sketches, such as Business Week or the Forbes online service of executive 
profiles and biographies. We also obtain additional information from the Osiris 
and Amadeus databases. We match director-level data with firm level data to 
                                                          
2 As the number of firms in our sample is small, if a firm has missing information for an item in a 
given year, we match the firm’s financial information available in Osiris with data from Compustat, 
to fill-in the missing value, if available. The firms in our sample represent a variable fraction of all 
non-financial firms listed in the Oslo Stock Exchange for the period 2001 - 2010. This fraction 
fluctuates between 65 percent (in 2003) to 48 percent (in 2007). 
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calculate the average at the firm level of the following variables: percentage of 
female board members, age, directors’ tenure, prior CEO experience of directors, 
level of studies, and current occupations. As in Ahern and Dittmar [2012], if more 
than a half of a firm’s board members data are missing for any variable, we drop 
the firm-year observation when we perform tests related to board composition or 
board characteristics. 
1.3.2 Identification strategies 
The passage of the Gender Quota affected all public limited liabilities companies in 
Norway, but its impact on these companies varied as many already had an 
important number of women on their boards. Some companies were even fulfilling 
the minimum level of gender diversity imposed by the Gender Quota before the 
Quota’s informal announcement in 2002. To analyze the impact of the Quota we 
implement a difference in difference approach and separate firms into those that 
were greatly affected by the Quota from those that were not, and analyze the 
differences between them. Since one can define the magnitude of the impact of the 
Quota on a firm in different ways, we perform our tests using two different 
identification strategies (ways to define what it means to be greatly affected by the 
Quota). In both cases, we separate companies into a treatment group (the group of 
companies that are greatly affected by the Quota), and a control group (those 
companies that are not greatly affected by the Quota). 
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Our first identification strategy classifies companies according to whether 
the company had female board members as of 2002, the year of the first (and 
informal) announcement of the Quota. This identification strategy is based on the 
premise that it is the qualitative presence of a female member on the board that 
determines whether the impact of the Quota is going to be important or not. A 
company that already had a female director in 2002 may find it easier to find and 
incorporate female board members without any major alteration of the functioning 
of the board. This can be the case because these firms have already in place proper 
mechanisms to identify the individuals that are better suited to become directors 
(for example, well-functioning nomination committees). Given the existence of 
these mechanisms, identifying additional women with the desired characteristics 
can be something that they can accomplish more easily than firms that do not have 
those mechanisms in place. This identification strategy yields the following 
groups: (1) the control group, composed of firms with at least a female board 
member in 2002, includes 26 firms (32 percent of the sample); (2) the treatment 
group, composed of firms with no female board members in 2002, includes 55 
firms (68 percent of the sample).  
In our second identification strategy we look at how far each company is 
from complying with the Quota. Because there is heterogeneity in the total number 
of board members, distance to compliance with the quota could be measured 
either in absolute terms (number of board members replaced) or in relative terms 
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(percentage of board members replaced). We focus on absolute distance, total 
number of new female members needed, although a classification in terms of 
relative distance leads to only minor changes in the control and treatment groups 
and the same qualitative results. 
In our sample, companies have five board members on average. Thus, 
under the conditions of the Quota, an average board is required to include at least 
two board members of each gender. This proportion varies slightly conditional on 
the board’s size: small boards with three members must include at least a board 
member of each gender, whereas boards with nine members (the largest in our 
sample) have to include four representatives of each sex. For our analysis, we 
classify a company as greatly affected by the Quota (the treatment group) if it had 
to hire two or more female board members, while firms that had to hire none or 
one female director make up the control group. Table 1.3 shows the number of 
companies per board size in 2007, and the number of female board members that 
were added to the board between 2002 and 2007. As can be seen in Table 1.3, the 
control group contains 19 firms (24 percent of the sample) and the treatment group 
62 firms (76 percent of the sample). 
To check that the two groups of firms (treatment vs control) differ only on 
the expected effects of the quota, and not on some other firm characteristics, in 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 we study the differences in size, leverage, cash, assets turnover 
and profitability across the two groups. Table 1.4 includes the differences between 
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groups classified using strategy one (female presence on the board in 2002). The 
only difference we find between treatment and control firms is that companies in 
the control group are larger (e.g. they have higher book value of assets and more 
employees). Larger companies have more board members, allowing for an easier 
incorporation of women to boards (Hillman et al. [2007]). Other variables related to 
firm characteristics are not significantly different between groups, which justifies 
our method of analysis. Results in Table 1.5 for identification strategy two 
(distance from Quota) are in line with those for identification strategy one. 
Further evidence that our criterion does indeed capture the impact of the 
Quota on companies comes from the fact that among all the firms in our sample 
that did not comply with the requirements of the Quota on the mandatory date (1st 
January 2008), and that were given a 4 week extension to comply or be liquidated, 
none had female board members in 2002 (they were all in the treatment group). We 
do not find evidence of this or other problems in complying with the Quota for 
firms in the control group.3 
1.3.3 Discretionary accruals measure  
Given the size of our sample of Norwegian firms we use the measure of 
discretionary accruals proposed by Francis and Wang [2008], adapted from 
DeFond and Park [2001]. This measure allows the computation of discretionary 
                                                          
3 A total of 72 Norwegian firms violated the January 2008 deadline, receiving a letter from the 
Norwegian Business register giving them 4 week notice to comply with the Gender Quota 
(Norwegian Minister of Children, Equality and Inclusion). Of these, only eleven are in our sample. 
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(strategy one) or firms forced to hire two or more female board members to fulfill 
the Gender Quota (strategy two); the interaction term Quota x No_Fem proxies for 
firms with higher Gender Quota’s compliance cost, during the years where the 
mandatory quota was binding and board changes were the biggest (2005 – 2010). 
We include a set of controls for known sources of discretionary accruals (size, 
leverage, growth, profitability and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm had 
losses on the previous year). We also include industry (two-digit SIC level) fixed 
effects and industry clustered errors. 
The main coefficient of interest is that of QuotaxNo_Fem, β1. A positive and 
significant coefficient will tell us that companies that are highly affected by the 
Gender Quota are recording significantly higher levels of unsigned discretionary 
accruals during the period when the mandatory quota was binding and board 
changes were the biggest, than those companies least affected by the Quota. 
 
1.4 Empirical results 
1.4.1 Effects of the quota on board composition over time 
A key effect of the Quota is that it generated unusually large changes in company 
boards. Norwegian firms in our sample started to make substantial changes to 
their boards due to the Gender Quota in 2005, at the end of the voluntary 
compliance period. The hiring of female board members peaked in 2007, the last 
year of the transition period after the issuing of the mandatory quota. Note also 
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that the number of new female entrants in 2008 was still high although firms were 
already fulfilling the 40 percent target, which implies a high level of turnover for 
female board members during that year. 
In the process of understanding the effect of the Quota, we must look at 
whether the changes were not only large but also if they led to the hiring of new 
directors that were substantially different (not only gender-wise, but also 
regarding their professional backgrounds) than the directors they replaced. 
Indeed, one of the main arguments of quota opponents was that a lack of qualified 
candidates would have a negative impact on companies. Table 1.6 Panel A 
describes the average characteristics of boards and board members and Panel B 
identifies the concurrent outside occupation of board members over the time 
period of our study. Overall, we find that the total number of members in a board 
remains stable around five. This shows that firms that needed to increase the 
percentage of female board members to comply with the quota did not just hire 
additional female directors, thereby increasing the size of the board. Instead, they 
replaced male by female board members. We also find that the number of board 
members with CEO experience decreases. The percentage of insiders (board 
members that receive remuneration from the firm other than compensation for 
board membership) also decreases. 
As mentioned before, panel B of Table 1.6 shows the outside occupation of 
board members over the time period of our study. After the quota, the percentage 
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of board members working in non-executive positions such as non-executive 
officer or CFO increases over time. Also, more executive oriented positions such as 
owner/partner decrease.7 In unreported results, we replicate Table 1.6 with firms 
with no female board members in 2002; the results are similar to, but stronger, than 
the changes reported for all the firms in the sample. 
Table 1.7 summarizes the average attributes of new, retained and exiting 
male and female board members, and the analysis of statistical differences in the 
means of these attributes between new female board members and retained and 
exiting male board members. 
In Panel A of Table 1.7, we find that new female board members are on 
average 9 (7) years younger than retained (exiting) male board members. New 
women members are also less likely to be firm insiders or a major shareholder.8 
Also, new female board members have lower executive experience, almost 41 
percent (37 percent) less compared with retained (exiting) male board members. 
However, entrant women are on average more likely to have Norwegian graduate 
education than exiting and retained men.9 In terms of current occupation—Panel B 
of Table 1.7—new female board members have a different distribution of 
occupations than retained and exiting male board members. Specifically, new 
                                                          
7 We classify board members working currently as owner/partner if they declare to be: partner, 
principal, owner, self-employed, independent, founder or/and investor. 
8 We define as a major shareholder a board member who owns directly or indirectly 5 percent or 
more of the companies’ shares. 
9 We define as a Norwegian Graduate a board member who has Graduate level education from a 
Norwegian institution. 
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female members are more likely to occupy non-executive positions. In contrast, 
new female members are less likely to be board members in other firms, and they 
are less likely to be CEOs or owner/partners. Hence, the aforementioned reduction 
in the proportion of board members with CEO experience or working currently as 
owner/partners is attributable to the inclusion of female board members, who are 
less likely to have executive experience. Moreover, new male board members show 
no significant differences with respect to exiting men (last column of Table 1.7). 
Overall, our evidence of board changes is consistent with the evidence provided by 
Ahern and Dittmar [2012] and the survey by Storvik [2011]. 
We conclude that this descriptive evidence is consistent with Norwegian 
boards being now more diverse in terms of experience, education and current 
occupation than they were before the quota. This diversity is, though, at the 
expense of members with experience in executive or owner/partnership positions. 
1.4.2 The effect of the quota over accounting quality 
Table 1.8 summarizes the results of the estimation of model (2), described in 
Section 1.3.4, using identification strategy one (female presence on the board). In 
column (1), the coefficient for Quota identifies the effects that are common to all 
companies during the period when firms’ boards experience higher changes and 
three years into the period when the Quota constraint is binding (from 2005 to 
2010)—this effect is statistically insignificant. Column (2) considers the effect of 
belonging to the affected group over the whole sample period in isolation. This 
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effect is positive and weakly significant (p < 0.1). Finally, column (3) considers both 
the common time effect, membership to the treatment group, and the interaction 
term—belonging to the treatment group during the transition period. The 
coefficient QuotaxNo_Fem1, (β1) is positive and statistically significant at standard 
levels (coefficient 0.039, p < 0.05). 
Thus, from Table 1.8, we conclude that firms with no female representation 
in 2002 are more likely to report higher levels of abnormal accruals over the period 
when changes to the boards were more pronounced and after the mandatory 
introduction of the quota (2005 - 2010). This evidence suggests that the Gender 
Quota negatively affected the level of monitoring exerted by boards, as reflected in 
higher discretionary accruals, for the firms most affected by the quota, in the 
period 2005-2010.  
We repeat the analysis in Table 1.8 with the second identification strategy 
(distance from Quota) and gather the results on Table 1.9. The results lead to the 
same conclusions, as the coefficient QuotaxNo_Fem2 is positive and significant 
(coeff. 0.040, p < 0.1). The results with the second identification strategy support 
our argument that firms that had to hire more women to meet the Quota reported 
higher levels of discretionary accruals. 
Overall, the results from Tables 1.8 and 1.9 suggest that after the passage of 
the mandatory Gender Quota the companies that were most affected by the Quota 
saw a reduced monitoring activity from their boards. These results are in line with 
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the view that firms optimally choose their boards (Adams et al. [2010]), appointing 
directors with certain attributes to optimize control over the firms’ management, 
and with the imposition of the Gender Quota acting as an exogenous shock to 
these optimally chosen boards. The mandatory inclusion of members from a 
restricted pool of candidates in a short period of time hindered the monitoring 
capabilities of boards from the time of the introduction of the quota until the end of 
our sample period (2005 - 2010). We now turn to study the temporal aspects of the 
Quota in greater detail. 
1.4.3 The effects of the quota over time 
A key question is how the effects of the Quota on earnings quality that we identify 
in our prior tests (Tables 1.8 and 1.9) behave over time; whether they persist over 
time or are clustered around the initial years, when boards are experiencing 
greater changes. If the effects that we identify are driven by the compulsion of 
replacing board members over a relatively short span of time and from a limited 
pool of candidates, then it is not clear whether the effects should persist over time. 
The need to hire new board members over a short period of time would lead to 
boards with a large percentage of new directors with lower experience and lower 
monitoring abilities. However, with the passage of time, the overall monitoring 
skills of the board can return to the pre Quota level. This return to the pre-quota 
monitoring level can be achieved through two channels: a) by an improvement in 
the monitoring capabilities of the existing board members thanks to their 
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experience as board members in the company, or by an improvement in the 
directors’ status as tenure increases, and/or b) by the replacement of less qualified 
board members by directors with more experience in accounting matters. 
Regarding the first channel, about directors improving their monitoring skills 
because of gaining experience and understanding better the firm, prior research 
suggests that experience as board members in the firm will not contribute to make 
directors better monitors of the accounting system (Kim et al. [2014]). However, it 
can be the case that directors with a good monitoring background (with accounting 
expertise) could not affect the financial reporting system because of, as being a 
newcomer, having a low status in the firm, and a lower ability to influence the 
overall view of the board (Badolato et al. [2014]). Therefore, as tenure increases, 
there directors would gain status and would be more able to influence board 
decisions. If this is the case, the monitoring ability of the board could increase with 
the passage of time. 
Regarding the second channel, we observe that even in 2008, there is a high 
percentage of replacement among board members. This large replacement rate that 
could in fact respond to attempts at improving the monitoring skills of board 
members, replacing less experienced by more experienced directors. If the learning 
effect, or the increase in directors’ status in a) takes place, or if the firm hires better 
board members over time, then we expect that, over time, the monitoring 
differences between control and treatment firms will tend to disappear. 
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To study the temporal aspects in greater detail we consider several 
alternative definitions of the Quota variable and summarize our results in Table 
1.10. In particular, we consider using the periods 2005 – 2009 (columns (1) and (2)), 
2005 – 2008 (columns (3) and (4)) and 2009 – 2010 (columns (5) and (6)). Results are 
as follows: We find that the coefficients on the QuotaxNo_Fem in Columns (1) to (4) 
from Table 1.10 are positive and significant, consistent with the results in Tables 1.8 
and 1.9. However, QuotaxNo_Fem1 and QuotaxNo_Fem2 are not significant for 
columns (5) and (6) implying that during the period 2009 – 2010 the Gender Quota 
had no effect over monitoring.10  Results are consistent with our assumption that 
the effects of the Gender Quota are clustered around the time period when boards 
experience higher changes, specifically the time period 2005 – 2009. We choose 
these time periods given the rate of female entrants: even though firms must 
comply with the quota in January 1st 2008, still in 2008 the appointment of new 
female directors remains high. Moreover, during the year 2009 female board 
members’ turnover was low, implying that the same directors of 2008 were in 
office. 
Unreported univariate tests are consistent with these results, suggesting that 
the difference in the level of earnings management between the treatment and 
                                                          
10 We re-estimate columns 5 and 6 dropping the years 2005 to 2008 from the sample (the years 
where changes to the boards were more pronounced). With this, we focus on the differential effects 
of 2009 and 2010, with respect to the period before the introduction of the massive changes to the 
boards (in particular, 2002 to 2004). Results also show that there is no difference in discretionary 
accruals between the two periods. This provides additional evidence that the effects of the quota 
over monitoring were short-lived. 
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control groups of firms appears in the period between 2005 and 2009, and 
disappears in 2010. Overall, these results are consistent with the expectation that 
the Gender Quota effects on monitoring are short lived, and clustered around the 
years when firms suffered greater changes in board composition to fulfill the 
quota. 
1.4.4 Robustness tests 
1.4.4.1 Measuring the effects using the Ahern and Dittmar approach 
Ahern and Dittmar [2012] analyze the effect of the introduction of the Quota on 
firm value using an instrumental variable approach. Even though the gender quota 
provides an exogenous shock to boards’ composition, Ahern and Dittmar [2012] 
raise concerns about the strategic timing of quota’s adoption by managers and 
shareholders. As the authors state, male board members could give up their 
board’s position in advance of the firm’s poor performance, or firms may relocate 
to a foreign country or go private to avoid the law. To address this, Ahern and 
Dittmar [2012] use as an instrument the pre-quota variation in female board 
representation across firms. As all firms have to comply with the targeted 40 
percent quota, firms with a higher proportion of female members are less time-
constrained when it comes to fulfilling the Quota than firms with a lower 
proportion of female members. 
We repeat our analyses using the pre-quota percent of women board 
members as the independent variable. We do this using both the period (2003 – 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
38 
2010) and the one proposed by Ahern and Dittmar [2012] (2003 – 2009), including 
year-specific dummies to control for market wide time effects. Table 1.11 presents 
the results. 
We find that the instrument has a weakly positive and significant coefficient 
(coeff. 0.164, p < 0.1) for the period 2003 – 2009, but not for 2003 – 2010. We 
interpret the positive and significant coefficient as an additional support to the 
negative effect of the quota on the quality of accounting numbers. More 
interestingly, the effect seems to disappear when year 2010 is included. This result 
strengthens our findings that the quota’s effects were short lived, and clustered 
around the years when changes are taking place. 
1.4.4.2 Extending the sample and implementation of Jones-type discretionary accruals 
models 
Given the relatively small sample size we work with, we cannot use directly 
typical measures of discretionary accruals estimated at the industry-year level. 
However, if we extend our sample and include firms from countries with similar 
accrual generating processes, we can construct the Jones measure of discretionary 
accruals for the Norwegian firms in our sample. To extend our sample, we use the 
institutional clustering in Leuz et al. [2003], where Norwegian firms are clustered 
together with those in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK. We then extend our 
sample by including the firms from those four countries with data availability in 
Osiris and estimate the Jones [1991] discretionary accruals model in cross-section 
for each industry-year but for all countries considered together. Even after 
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clustering with firms from these four countries, there are some industry-year 
combinations without enough observations to estimate the model (we impose a 
minimum of 7 observations per two digit industry-year combination). Given this, 
we are not able to estimate accruals for all the Norwegian firms in our sample, and 
we had to drop 25 firm-year observations overall. 
Using the abnormal discretionary accruals estimated in this fashion, we 
replicate our main tests using the new unsigned discretionary accruals and 
regressing them against the QuotaxNo_Fem and the set of control variables (as in 
Model (2)). We explore different specifications and combinations of countries but 
results are inconclusive. 
This is not entirely surprising, given that the use of the Jones model in 
international settings has been criticized in the literature for failing to capture 
earnings management. In an international setting, differences in institutional and 
economic diversity amongst countries may increase the noise in the estimation so 
much as to make it impossible to detect earnings management (Peek et al. [2012]). 
1.4.4.3 Use of balanced panels 
We also analyze the robustness of the results using a reduced set of firms for which 
we can build balanced panels. Therefore, we repeat the analysis of Tables 1.8 and 
1.9 for the 73 firms with data for the period 2002 – 2009 and the 69 firms with data 
for the period 2002 – 2010. Again, we find the interaction coefficient QuotaxNo_Fem 
to be positive and significant using the 2002 – 2009 panel for both identification 
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strategies. When we use the smaller sample that is complete for the 2002 – 2010 
period, we only find significant results for identification strategy one. This result is 
in line with the effects concentrating around the years when the changes to the 
boards were more pronounced. 
 
1.5 Board characteristics and accounting quality 
1.5.1 Board members personal attributes and characteristics 
Thus far, we have focused on determining what effect, if any, the introduction of 
the Quota had on earnings management. A simplistic interpretation of the above 
results would link the negative effects we have found to the gender of the new 
board members. However, as we report in the descriptive statistics (Tables 1.6 and 
1.7), the changes associated with the introduction of the Quota did not just affect 
the gender of board members, but it also led to changes in the overall distribution 
of the skills and characteristics of the boards. Thus, the natural next step is to 
identify what skills or characteristics are more closely associated with the negative 
effects of the Quota. We thus proceed by first estimating the relationship between 
changes in board gender diversity and board characteristics, and then turn to 
study the relationship between discretionary accruals and board characteristics. 
In a first set of tests, we use the pre-quota percentage of women on the 
board as an explanatory variable of several board characteristics. In particular, we 
explore the relationship between having a greater percentage of women on the 
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board and: board size, average board age (as a proxy for overall experience), 
proportion of members with experience as CEO, major shareholders, and the 
proportion of board insiders. The results are consistent with the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1.7. Once the Quota is implemented and the proportion of female 
board members increase, the proportion of board members with CEO experience 
diminishes. Also, while the average board is younger, the size of the board remains 
constant.  
To continue our analysis, we look at the relationship between these board 
characteristics and unsigned discretionary accruals. Table 1.13, column (1) contains 
the results for the regression of the main characteristics (Female, board size, age, 
major shareholder, CEO experience and CEO experience squared) plus the usual 
controls. In column (2) CEO experience (and its squared) are replaced by a set of 
dummy variables indicating the presence on the board of a member working 
currently in any of the following occupation: vice-president, consultant, professor, 
CEO, non-executive officer, CFO, accountant or lawyer. 
We find that the proportion of variable female board members is not 
significantly associated with earnings quality. On the other hand, the presence of 
major shareholders is negatively associated with the level of discretionary accruals 
(coeff. -0.05, p < 0.1), while CEO experience has a statistically significant non-linear 
effect. When we replace CEO experience with the set of dummy variables 
accounting for the presence of at least one board member with a given current 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
42 
occupation, we find that only CFO experience is statistically significant (with a 
negative coefficient), though the power of that estimation is lower because of the 
large number of additional variables added to the estimation. 
The negative and significant coefficient on major shareholder is consistent 
with prior evidence of the positive effect of block holders on boards over 
monitoring (Klein [2002]). The non-linear effect of CEO experience can be 
interpreted as follows: board members with previous CEO experience reduce the 
level of discretionary accruals. However, the marginal contribution of more board 
members with CEO experience to monitoring is not significant. The negative 
association between previous CFO experience and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (coeff. -0.038, p < 0.05) is consistent with the assumption that 
earnings management is less likely when the monitoring is performed by directors 
with higher levels of financial expertise (McDaniel et al. [2002]; DeFond et al. 
[2005]; Krishnan and Visvanathan [2008]; Dhaliwal et al. [2010]). Overall, we 
interpret these results as evidence that the economic effect of the Quota must not 
be interpreted in terms of gender, but must be evaluated in the context of the 
characteristics of board members. 
1.5.2 Co – opted boards 
Hermalin and Weisbach [1998] and Coles et al. [2014] provide evidence that when 
CEOs are more entrenched they appoint new directors that are acquiescent. Coles 
et al. [2014] define board co-option as the percentage of board members elected 
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during the current CEO’s tenure. As boards become more co-opted, the level of 
monitoring over the CEO activities diminishes. In this sense, the massive 
appointment of board members given the Norwegian Gender Quota provides an 
adequate setting for testing the hypothesis of increasing earnings management as 
boards’ co-option (the presence of ‘captured’ directors) increases. We use the two 
measures of co-option proposed by Coles et al. [2014]—proportion of co-opted 
board members and proportion of director-years served by directors appointed by 
the current CEO—to study the relation between discretionary accruals and boards’ 
co-option. In unreported results, we do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between both co-option measures and discretionary accruals. Thus, 
our results of increased earnings management because of the passage of the quota 
do not seem to be attributable to changes in board co-option. 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
We study whether the Norwegian law requiring a minimum of a 40 percent of 
women on the boards of public firms had effects on the monitoring capabilities of 
boards of directors. In particular, we analyze whether the quality of accounting 
numbers was affected. Using a hand-collected database of board members’ 
personal and professional attributes, we test the assumption that after the Gender 
Quota new boards are younger, have different backgrounds and have lower 
executive experience. We hypothesize that these younger, less experienced boards, 
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are less prepared to fulfill one of the main roles of board of directors: monitoring. 
We argue that the boards monitoring capability of the firms most affected by the 
quota is reduced, compared to boards whose members were chosen freely by 
shareholders, before the passage of the quota.  To test this decrease in monitoring 
capability, we look at an output of monitoring: the quality of accounting numbers. 
As a proxy for the quality of accounting numbers we use the unsigned 
discretionary accruals from the Francis and Wang [2008] model. Our results 
suggest that, after the passage of the Gender Quota, earnings management is more 
pronounced in firms for which the impact of the passage of the quota was larger. 
To identify the firms for which implementing the quota was most costly we focus 
on firms without women in 2002 (the year before the quota was announced) and 
on firms who needed to hire more women to comply with the requirements of the 
quota. 
We also find evidence of associations between board characteristics and the 
current occupation of board members and earnings management. In particular, the 
presence of major shareholders and board members with executive experience is 
negatively related to abnormal accruals. Also, our results provide evidence of a 
negative and significant relation between boards with at least one board member 
working currently as a CFO and our proxy for earnings management.  
Overall, our results suggest that forced changes in corporate governance 
weaken internal control mechanisms, as monitoring. This effect could be one of the 
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forces leading to the reduction of firm value driven by the introduction of the 
quota documented by Ahern and Dittmar [2012], and to the decision to change to a 
legal status not affected by the quota documented by Bøhren and Staubo [2014]. 
Though we find evidence that gender quotas have negative effects in terms of 
accounting quality, these effects are limited to a short time period after the quota 
implementation. This study leaves an open window for further research on the 
long run effects of the Gender Quota on accounting quality. As proponents of 
gender quotas claim, once there is a critical mass of women on top positions more 
women can find their way to executive positions and acquire the desired skills to 
become efficient monitors. Overall, considering the current debate regarding 
whether gender quotas should be imposed, our evidence is especially relevant to 
widen our understanding of the consequences of such regulations in the short run. 
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1.B Tables 
Table 1.1 – Descriptive statistics of variables included in the study 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Log of Sales 12.152 12.148 2.037 
Log of Assets 12.560 12.427 1.868 
Log of Employees 6.497 6.555 1.870 
Leverage 0.563 0.596 0.201 
Cash over Assets 0.166 0.111 0.168 
Short Term Debt over Assets 0.066 0.040 0.209 
Working Capital over Assets 0.157 0.127 0.209 
Assets Turnover 0.946 0.883 0.633 
Return over Assets 0.027 0.051 0.159 
Lag Loss 0.332 0.000 0.471 
Growth of Sales 0.287 0.122 1.315 
Abs. Accruals over Assets 0.095 0.066 0.103 
Abs. Abnormal Accruals over Assets 0.116 0.073 0.137 
Board Size 5.332 5.000 1.057 
Females on Boards 0.283 0.400 0.181 
Observations 692   
Notes to Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the study. Log of Sales is the log of 
firm’s sales; Log of Assets is the log of the book value of firm’s assets; Log of Employees is the log of 
firm’s employees, when available; Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; Cash over Assets is 
firm’s cash holdings over assets; Short Term Debt over Assets is the ratio of firm’s stock of short term 
debt over assets; Working Capital over Assets is the ratio of firm’s working capital over assets, where 
working capital is defined as current assets minus current liabilities; Assets Turnover is sales over 
total assets; Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets; Lag loss is a dummy variable taking value 
one if the firm has recorded a loss in the previous year; Growth of sales is the yearly change in sales; 
Abs. Accruals over Assets is the ratio of firm’s total accruals in absolute value estimated using the 
Francis and Wang (2008) model over assets; Abs. Abnormal Accruals over Assets is the ratio of firm’s 
abnormal accruals in absolute value estimated using the Francis and Wang (2008) model over 
assets; Board Size is the size of firm’s Board of Directors; Females on Boards is the proportion of 
female board members in firm’s Board of Directors.  
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Table 1.2 – Pairwise correlation between variables included in the study 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Log of Sales 
              
2.Log of Assets 0.8283              
3.Log of Employees 0.9050 0.8161             
4.Leverage 0.3732 0.2316 0.3738            
5.Cash over Assets -0.3569 -0.3043 -0.4143 -0.4783           
6.ST Debt over 
Assets 
-0.0049 -0.0297 -0.0209 0.4197 -0.2401          
7.Work. Capital over 
Assets 
-0.2125 -0.2478 -0.2815 -0.5646 0.7440 -0.4690         
8.Assets Turnover 0.1754 -0.2701 0.0866 0.1992 -0.1553 0.0212 0.0214        
9.Return over Assets 0.4100 0.3880 0.3544 0.0095 -0.1742 -0.1586 0.0355 0.1178       
10. Lag Loss -0.2671 -0.3079 -0.2804 0.0402 0.0916 0.0670 0.0050 0.0133 -0.4703      
11.Growth of Sales -0.0687 -0.0167 -0.0791 -0.0692 0.0653 -0.0451 0.0315 -0.0810 -0.0226 0.0530     
12.Abs. Accruals 
over Assets 
-0.0814 -0.1108 -0.1246 0.0389 -0.0055 0.0814 -0.1128 -0.0254 -0.2498 0.1294 0.0142    
13.Abs. Abnormal 
Accruals over Assets 
-0.1653 -0.2242 -0.2526 0.0076 0.0189 0.0983 0.0213 0.0446 -0.1668 0.1836 0.1663 0.5956   
14.Board Size 0.3333 0.4061 0.3815 0.1170 -0.0577 -0.0454 -0.1153 -0.1962 0.1264 -0.1291 -0.0037 0.0113 -0.0706  
15.Femlaes on 
Boards 
0.3686 0.4348 0.3533 -0.0055 -0.1573 0.0183 -0.1171 -0.0877 0.1922 -0.2108 -0.0366 -0.0950 -0.0752 0.1787 
Notes to Table 1.2: Correlations between variables included in the study. Log of Sales is the log of firm’s sales; Log of Assets is the log of the book 
value of firm’s assets; Log of Employees is the log of firm’s employees, when available; Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; Cash over Assets is 
firm’s cash holdings over assets; Short Term Debt over Assets is the ratio of firm’s stock of short term debt over assets; Working Capital over Assets is 
the ratio of firm’s working capital over assets, where working capital is defined as current assets minus current liabilities; Assets Turnover is sales 
over total assets; Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets; Lag loss is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm has recorded a loss in the 
previous year; Growth of sales is the yearly change in sales; Abs. Accruals over Assets is the ratio of firm’s total accruals in absolute value estimated 
using the Francis and Wang (2008) model over assets; Abs. Abnormal Accruals over Assets is the ratio of firm’s abnormal accruals in absolute value 
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estimated using the Francis and Wang (2008) model over assets; Board Size is the size of firm’s Board of Directors; Females on Boards is the 
proportion of female board members in firm’s Board of Directors. 
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Table 1.3 – Number of companies by amount of hired female-directors in 
the period 2002 – 2007 and board size in 2007 
Hired 
Women 
Board size in 2007 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
0 1 0 2 2 1 0 
1 0 0 11 0 2 0 
2 // 8 33 3 3 1 
3 // // // 8 6 0 
Notes to Table 1.3: board size in 2007 is the number of shareholder elected board members as 
reported by the Norwegian Business Register at the end of the year 2007. Hired women is the 
difference between the number of female board members in 2007 compared to 2002. 
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Table 1.4 – Difference in firms characteristics in the year 2002.  
Identification strategy one 
 Control Treatment Difference Standard Error 
Log of Sales 12.989 11.014 1.975*** 0.418 
Log of Assets 13.293 11.248 2.045*** 0.397 
Log of Employees 7.557 5.585 1.973*** 0.418 
Leverage 0.629 0.565 0.063 0.053 
Cash over Assets 0.143 0.205 -0.062 0.046 
Assets Turnover 1.024 1.083 -0.059 0.182 
Return over Assets -0.014 -0.064 0.050 0.067 
Observations 26 55   
Notes to Table 1.4: control group is the set of firms with at least a female board member in 2002. 
Treatment is the rest of the sample. Log of Sales is the log of firm’s sales; Log of Assets is the log of the 
book value of firm’s assets; Log of Employees is the log of firm’s employees, when available; Leverage 
is the ratio of Total Assets over Total Liabilities; Cash over Assets is cash and other short term 
investments over total assets; Assets Turnover is sales over total assets; Return over Assets is EBIT 
over total assets. *** Significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 1.5 – Difference in firms characteristics in the year 2002. 
Identification strategy two 
 Control Treatment Difference Standard Error 
Log of Sales 12.786 11.303 1.483*** 0.494 
Log of Assets 13.206 11.506 1.700*** 0.468 
Log of Employees 7.307 5.872 1.434*** 0.498 
Leverage 0.589 0.585 0.004 0.059 
Cash over Assets 0.173 0.189 -0.016 0.052 
Assets Turnover 0.969 1.094 -0.125 0.200 
Return over Assets -0.038 -0.050 0.012 0.074 
Observations 19 62   
Notes to Table 1.5: control group is the set of firms fulfilling the quota in 2002 or firms having to hire 
only a single female board member to fulfill it. Treatment is the rest of the sample. Log of Sales is the 
log of firm’s sales; Log of Assets is the log of the book value of firm’s assets; Log of Employees is the 
log of firm’s employees, when available; Leverage is the ratio of Total Assets over Total Liabilities; 
Cash over Assets is cash and other short term investments over total assets; Assets Turnover is sales 
over total assets; Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets. *** Significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 1.6 – Average Board of Directors’ characteristics by year 
Panel A. Board characteristics  
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Members 5.37 5.32 5.16 5.22 5.27 5.42 5.37 5.46 5.26 5.45 
Retained (%) 
 78.46 78.24 83.87 81.74 80.99 73.24 80.49 82.31 81.04 
Female (%) 
6.71 7.69 11.43 15.18 23.23 30.51 40.94 42.06 42.12 43.43 
Age 
51.89 51.97 52.55 52.76 52.10 52.07 51.73 52.26 52.59 52.77 
Norwegian (%) 89.56 89.86 86.23 85.41 85.41 84.87 85.28 84.93 83.73 81.14 
Tenure 3.62 3.81 3.78 3.99 4.13 4.27 3.92 4.04 4.49 4.37 
Insider (%) 
9.30 7.08 4.86 5.11 5.19 5.50 3.70 3.77 3.41 4.23 
Family (%) 
4.61 4.46 3.38 3.32 3.04 2.90 2.96 3.11 3.29 4.24 
Major Shareholder (%) 
28.81 31.15 28.57 29.42 26.08 24.87 23.74 24.07 26.80 27.48 
CEO experience (%) 
70.01 72.90 74.55 72.44 68.30 65.34 62.36 63.74 65.47 64.22 
MBA education (%) 24.60 25.70 24.72 24.80 25.45 25.70 25.77 26.25 24.83 26.50 
Norwegian Grad (%) 20.02 19.62 18.02 19.15 19.80 23.26 24.61 23.11 23.33 23.38 
Other Grad (%) 
16.48 15.89 15.61 16.73 19.87 19.47 16.64 16.82 18.87 20.42 
Notes to Table 1.6 Panel A: Average Board Characteristics for firms in our sample, where available. 
Retained is the percentage of board members present in year t-1 and year t; Female is the percentage 
of female board members; Norwegian is the percentage of board members with Norwegian 
citizenship; Tenure is the average tenure of board members; Insider is the percentage of board 
members who are firm’s employees; Family is the percentage of board members sharing any family 
relationship with respect of other board members or the executive team; Major Shareholder is the 
proportion of board members owning directly or indirectly more than 5 percent of the firm’s shares; 
CEO experience is the percentage of board members with executive experience; MBA education is the 
percentage of board members with executive education; Norwegian Grad is the percentage of board 
members with graduate level education from a Norwegian institution; Other Grad is the percentage 
of board members with graduate level education from a non-Norwegian institution. Data of Tenure 
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is computed using information from the Annual Reports or from the Norwegian Business Register, 
where available. 
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Table 1.6 – (Continued) 
Panel B. Outside occupation of shareholder elected directors (%) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Vice President 5.21 4.99 4.29 4.06 4.29 5.48 5.26 5.33 6.26 4.67 
Consultant 10.84 14.26 18.29 16.45 15.00 13.75 14.99 12.95 13.12 12.57 
Board Member 75.61 79.64 81.16 80.23 79.66 80.89 78.64 79.22 80.30 79.28 
Professor 2.88 1.93 1.29 1.63 2.12 2.06 1.96 2.29 1.68 1.56 
CEO 28.71 27.85 28.98 29.58 29.37 28.56 26.43 27.35 27.74 27.33 
Attorney 9.24 8.27 7.18 7.49 8.23 8.21 9.49 8.08 8.34 9.34 
Non-exe. Officer 5.93 4.11 3.83 5.03 6.19 7.62 8.41 7.50 6.75 9.41 
CFO 1.59 1.43 2.31 3.52 3.89 4.28 4.22 4.46 4.31 5.70 
Owner/partner 41.62 44.45 41.65 39.97 36.91 34.18 32.43 31.58 33.13 30.66 
Accountant 2.42 1.82 3.03 2.44 2.87 3.33 2.60 2.58 2.99 2.50 
Other 4.31 3.86 3.95 4.19 4.47 5.94 6.00 5.38 4.96 4.77 
Observations 72 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 73 69 
Notes to Table 1.6 Panel B: Average outside occupation of shareholders elected directors for firms in 
our sample, where available. We exclude from this analysis firms with missing data for any 
variable for more than a half of firm’s board members. Occupations are defined as: Vice-president: 
vice-presidency of any kind; Consultant: consultant, advisor, counselor; Board member: chair, deputy 
chair, member; Professor: professor of any kind; CEO: Chief Executive Officer, general manager, 
president, managing director, administrative Director; Attorney: attorney, lawyer, advocate, studies 
in law; Non–executive Officer: Manager, Head of (sales, Human Resources, etc.), Chief Operating 
Officer, marketing, general secretary; CFO: Chief Financial Officer, Investment Officer; 
Partner/principal: partner, principal, owner, self-employed, independent, founder, investor; 
Accountant: chartered accountant, payroll, controller, controlling; Other: any other occupation not 
described before. Outside occupations are not mutually exclusive and so do not add 100 percent.  
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Table 1.7 – Characteristics of New, Retained and Exiting board members, by Gender 
 
  New  Retained  Exiting  Differences 
  Women Men  Women Men  Women Men  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (1)-(4) (1)-(6) (2)-(6) 
Panel A. Demographics 
Age  46.10 50.32  48.74 55.13  47.68 53.17  -9.03*** -7.07*** -2.85*** 
           (0.442) (0.563) (0.584) 
Tenure  0.00 0.00  2.95 5.85  2.10 4  -5.85*** -4.00*** -4.00*** 
           (0.135) (0.191) (0.191) 
Norwegian (%)  79.94 79.15  84.25 86.68  83.55 83.92  -6.75*** -3.98 -4.77** 
           (2.394) (2.751) (2.507) 
Insider (%)  1.30 4.45  3.30 5.68  2.00 6.69  -4.36*** -5.39*** -2.24* 
           (0.813) (1.232) (1.445) 
Family (%)  2.26 1.16  3.67 3.66  1.31 2.10  -1.40 0.16 -0.94** 
           (0.935) (1.037) (0.794) 
Major Share. (%)  6.19 27.87  10.03 35.03  4.70 24.20  -28.84*** -18.02*** 3.66 
           (1.713) (2.268) (2.822) 
CEO exp. (%)  37.29 79.04  43.54 77.99  30.82 74.54  -40.70*** -37.24*** 4.50 
           (2.921) (3.358) (2.751) 
MBA (%)  22.22 26.97  26.50 25.86  22.69 24.25  -3.64 -2.03 2.72 
           (2.599) (3.092) (2.952) 
Norw. Grad (%)  30.20 20.36  28.72 17.19  33.33 18.67  13.01*** 11.53*** 1.68 
           (2.789) (3.186) (2.682) 
Other Grad (%)  21.55 19.85  19.57 17.58  17.73 19.44  3.97 2.11 0.41 
           (2.531) (2.976) (2.684) 
Notes to Table 1.7: Differences on personal characteristics by shareholder elected Board Members’ type for the 81 firms in our sample is estimated 
for the period 2002 – 2010, where available. New are Board Members entering the board in year t; Exiting are Board Members present in year t-1 but 
not in year t; Retained are Board Members present both in year t and t-1. Tenure is the average tenure of board members; Norwegian is the 
percentage of board members with Norwegian citizenship; Insider is the percentage of board members who are firm’s employees; Family is the 
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percentage of board members sharing any family relationship with respect of other board members or the executive team; Major Shareholder is the 
proportion of board members owning directly or indirectly more than 5 percent of the firm’s shares; CEO experience is the percentage of board 
members with executive experience; MBA education is the percentage of board members with executive education; Norwegian Grad is the 
percentage of board members with graduate level education from a Norwegian institution; Other Grad is the percentage of board members with 
graduate level education from a non-Norwegian institution. Data of Tenure is computed using information from the Annual Reports or from the 
Norwegian Business Register, where available. Differences are obtained from a two sample t test with unequal variances. Standard errors reported 
in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  
Chapter 1                                                  
 
 
 
58 
Table 1.7 – Continued 
 
  New  Retained  Exiting  Differences 
  Women Men  Women Men  Women Men  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (1)-(4) (1)-(6) (2)-(6) 
Panel B. Primary outside occupation (%) 
Vice President  7.59 5.05  7.26 3.77  11.64 5.72  3.82** 1.87 -0.89 
                (1.578) (1.822) (1.452) 
Consultant  16.83 17.55  12.80 14.67  18.49 15.87  2.16 0.96 1.77 
                (2.283) (2.665) (2.446) 
Board Member  68.98 80.29  71.37 84.41  64.38 78.23  -15.44*** -9.25*** 1.96 
                (2.773) (3.199) (2.645) 
Professor  3.63 0.00  4.35 1.19  4.79 1.48  2.43** 2.15* -1.48*** 
                (1.101) (1.195) (0.518) 
CEO  21.78 32.21  27.44 28.51  19.86 27.68  -6.72*** -5.89** 4.45 
                (2.565) (3.061) (2.996) 
Attorney  10.56 6.97  13.06 6.90  10.96 7.56  3.66** 3.00 -0.56 
                (1.850) (2.102) (1.694) 
Non-exe. Officer  18.48 2.40  12.66 3.13  16.44 4.43  15.35*** 14.05*** -2.01 
                (2.272) (2.402) (1.163) 
CFO  5.61 5.53  4.88 2.99  3.42 2.58  2.62* 3.03** 2.73** 
                (1.374) (1.489) (1.297) 
Owner/partner  13.20 37.02  19.26 44.18  15.75 41.14  -30.98*** -27.94*** -3.94 
                (2.220) (2.876) (3.183) 
Accountant  1.98 2.16  3.43 3.26  2.05 1.66  -1.28 0.32 0.52 
                (0.888) (0.972) (0.904) 
Other  7.59 3.61  7.78 4.09  9.59 4.06  3.50** 3.53** -0.44 
            (1.582) (1.744) (1.251) 
Observations  317 433  770 2255  159 599     
Notes to Table 1.7 (continued): Differences on personal characteristics by shareholder elected Board Members’ type for the 81 firms in our sample is 
estimated for the period 2002 – 2010, where available. New are Board Members entering the board in year t; Exiting are Board Members present in 
year t-1 but not in year t; Retained are Board Members present both in year t and t-1. Occupations are defined as: Vice-president: vice-presidency of 
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any kind; Consultant: consultant, advisor, counselor; Board Member: chair, deputy chair, member; Professor: professor of any kind; CEO: Chief 
Executive Officer, general manager, president, managing director, administrative director; Attorney: attorney, lawyer, advocate, studies in law; 
Non–executive Officer: Manager, Head of (sales, Human Resources, etc.), Chief Operating Officer, marketing, general secretary; CFO: Chief Financial 
Officer, Investment Officer; Partner/principal: partner, principal, owner, self-employed, independent, founder, investor; Accountant: chartered 
accountant, payroll, controller, controlling; Other: any other occupation not described before. Differences are obtained from a two sample t test 
with unequal variances. Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1.8 – Panel Regressions for Identification Strategy One.  
Dependent variable: unsigned discretionary accruals estimated using the  
Francis and Wang [2008] model 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Quota 0.014    -0.014  
 (0.015)    (0.017)  
No_Fem1   0.043*  0.016  
   (0.022)  (0.022)  
QuotaxNo_Fem1     0.039**  
     (0.018)  
Log of Sales -0.009**  -0.005  -0.005  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Growth 0.016**  0.016***  0.017***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Leverage 0.079*  0.063  0.062  
 (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.040)  
Lag loss 0.028**  0.026*  0.028**  
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
Return over Assets -0.052  -0.055  -0.059  
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048)  
Constant 0.164***  0.095*  0.113**  
 (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.052)  
Industry Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
F – Statistics 6.04 (0.00)  5.03 (0.00)  5.15 (0.00)  
Adj R-sqr 0.064  0.076  0.080  
Observations 692  692  692  
Notes to Table 1.8: Quota is a dummy variable taking value one for the period 2005 – 2010, zero 
otherwise; No_Fem1 is a dummy variable taking value one for firms with no female representation 
on their Boards in 2002. Log of Sales is the natural logarithm of sales; Growth is the yearly change in 
sales; Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; Lag loss is a dummy variable taking value one if the 
firm has recorded a loss in the previous year; Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets. Standard 
errors clustered at industry (two-digit) level are presented beneath the coefficients, within 
parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1.9 – Panel Regressions for Identification Strategy Two.  
Dependent variable: unsigned discretionary accruals estimated using the  
Francis and Wang [2008] model 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Quota 0.014    -0.018  
 (0.015)    (0.022)  
No_Fem2   0.030*  0.003  
   (0.018)  (0.023)  
QuotaxNo_Fem2     0.040*  
     (0.020)  
Log of Sales -0.009**  -0.006  -0.007*  
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Growth 0.016**  0.016***  0.017***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Leverage 0.079*  0.063  0.064  
 (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.042)  
Lag loss 0.028**  0.026*  0.027*  
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  
Return over Assets -0.052  -0.053  -0.056  
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.048)  
Constant 0.164***  0.122***  0.142***  
 (0.049)  (0.043)  (0.047)  
Industry Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
F – Statistics 6.04 (0.00)  5.64 (0.00)  6.70 (0.00)  
Adj R-sqr 0.064  0.068  0.072  
Observations 692  692  692  
Notes to Table 1.9: Quota is a dummy variable taking value one for the period 2005 – 2010, zero 
otherwise; No_Fem2 is a dummy variable taking value one for firms forced to hire two or more 
female board members to fulfill the Gender Quota at the end of 2007. Log of Sales is the natural 
logarithm of sales; Growth is the yearly change in sales; Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; 
Lag loss is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm has recorded a loss in the previous year; 
Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets. Standard errors clustered at industry (two-digit) level 
are presented beneath the coefficients, within parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1.10 – Panel Regressions for Identification Strategies One and Two.  
Dependent variable: unsigned discretionary accruals estimated using the 
Francis and Wang [2008] model 
 
 Quota 2005 - 2009  Quota 2005 - 2008  Quota 2009 - 2010 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Quota -0.016  -0.017  -0.009  -0.011  -0.006  -0.008 
 (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
No_Fem1 0.017    0.025    0.044   
 (0.020)    (0.017)    (0.026)   
No_Fem2   0.007    0.014    0.031 
   (0.020)    (0.017)    (0.021) 
QuotaxNo_Fem 0.043**  0.041**  0.037*  0.036*  -0.002  0.001 
 (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Log of Sales -0.005  -0.007  -0.005  -0.006  -0.004  -0.006 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Growth 0.016***  0.016***  0.016***  0.016***  0.016***  0.016*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Leverage 0.061  0.062  0.058  0.059  0.060  0.060 
 (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.040) 
Lag loss 0.029**  0.028**  0.031**  0.030**  0.027*  0.027* 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Return over Assets -0.060  -0.058  -0.060  -0.058  -0.057  -0.055 
 (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Constant 0.111**  0.139***  0.102*  0.130***  0.092  0.120** 
 (0.050)  (0.045)  (0.052)  (0.045)  (0.056)  (0.045) 
Industry Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F – Statistics 5.77 (0.00)  7.64 (0.00)  9.15 (0.00)  12.15  4.46 (0.00)  5.72 (0.00) 
Adj R-sqr 0.082  0.073  0.081  0.073  0.074  0.066 
Observations 692  692  692  692  692  692 
Notes to Table 1.10: Quota is a dummy variable taking value one for the time period specified over 
the columns’ headlines, zero otherwise; No_Fem1 is a dummy variable taking value one if firm has 
not at least a female board member in 2002, zero otherwise; No_Fem2 is a dummy variable taking 
value one for firms forced to hire two or more female board members to fulfill the Gender Quota at 
the end of 2007. Log of Sales is the natural logarithm of sales; Growth is the yearly change in sales; 
Leverage is total liabilities over total assets; Lag loss is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm 
has recorded a loss in the previous year; Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets. Standard errors 
clustered at industry (two-digit) level are presented beneath the coefficients, within parentheses. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1.11 – Ahern and Dittmar [2012] methodology. Dependent variable: 
unsigned discretionary accruals estimated using the 
Francis and Wang [2008] model 
 
 2003 – 2009 
Sample 
2003 – 2010 
Sample 
 (1) (2) 
Percent women 0.164* 0.133 
 (0.096) (0.085) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes 
F - Statistics 3.17 (0.00) 2.97 (0.01) 
Observations 545 614 
Notes to Table 1.11: Data are yearly observations from 2003—2009 in column (1) and 2003 – 2010 in 
column (2). Regressions are estimated using the proportion of female board members in 2002 as 
instrument for the independent variable Percent women. Standard errors clustered at firm level are 
presented beneath the coefficients, within parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 1.12 – Panel Regressions for testing the effect of increasing board 
gender diversity on board characteristics. Dependent variable: board 
characteristics 
  
 Board Size Age CEO exp. Major 
Shareholder 
Insider 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percent women 0.450 -9.334** -0.404** -0.121 -0.181** 
 (0.832) (3.399) (0.162) (0.150) (0.066) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F - Statistics 1.76 (0.10) 2.35 (0.03) 3.49 (0.00) 1.20 (0.30) 1.85 (0.08) 
Observations 614 614 608 608 608 
Notes to Table 1.12: All variables are defined in Appendix A. Regression using the proportion of 
female board members in 2002 as instrument for the independent variable Percent women. Board Size 
is the number of shareholder elected board members; Age is the average age of board members; 
CEO exp. is the percentage of board members with executive experience; Major Shareholder is the 
percentage of board members owning 5 percent or more of the firm’s shares, directly or indirectly; 
Insider is the percentage of board members who are firm’s employees. Standard errors clustered at 
firm level are presented beneath the coefficients, within parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 1.13 – Panel Regressions for Board Characteristics.  
Dependent variable: unsigned discretionary accruals  
estimated using Francis and Wang [2008] model 
 
 (1)  (2) 
Female -0.056  -0.075 
 (0.053)  (0.054) 
Board Size 0.009  0.015 
 (0.008)  (0.009) 
Age -0.002  -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
Major Shareholder -0.050*  -0.053* 
 (0.027)  (0.029) 
CEO experience -0.270*   
 (0.158)   
CEO experience2 0.247*   
 (0.122)   
Vice – President   -0.007 
   (0.014) 
Consultant   -0.027 
   (0.016) 
Professor   -0.030 
   (0.029) 
CEO   -0.013 
   (0.018) 
Attorney   -0.011 
   (0.009) 
Non-exe. Officer   -0.008 
   (0.011) 
CFO   -0.038** 
   (0.014) 
Accountant   -0.024 
   (0.015) 
(cont. in the next page) 
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(cont. from the previous page) 
Log of Sales -0.009**  -0.007* 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
Growth 0.014**  0.013** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
Leverage 0.076  0.078 
 (0.046)  (0.052) 
Lag loss 0.028**  0.032** 
 (0.015)  (0.015) 
Return over Assets -0.066  -0.062 
 (0.051)  (0.050) 
Constant 0.256**  0.205** 
 (0.125)  (0.093) 
Industry Effects Yes  Yes 
Time effects Yes  Yes 
F – Statistics 18.72 (0.00)  4068 (0.00) 
Adj R-sqr 0.096  0.100 
Observations 685  685 
Notes to Table 1.13: Variables in column (1) are defined as: Female is the percentage of female board 
members; Board size is the number of shareholder elected board members; Age is the age of the 
board members; Major Shareholder is the percentage of board members owning directly or indirectly 
5 percent or more of the firm’s shares; CEO experience is the proportion of board members with 
executive experience; CEO experience2 is the square of the percentage of board members with 
executive experience. Variables in column (2) are defined as: Vice-president: vice-presidency of any 
kind; Consultant: consultant, advisor, counselor; Professor: professor of any kind; CEO: Chief 
Executive Officer, general manager, president, managing director, administrative director; Attorney: 
attorney, lawyer, advocate, studies in law; Non–executive Officer: Manager, Head of (sales, Human 
Resources, etc.), Chief Operating Officer, marketing, general secretary; CFO: Chief Financial Officer, 
Investment Officer; Accountant: chartered accountant, payroll, controller, controlling. The 
occupation variables are dummy variables equal to one if the Board includes at least one member 
with the current occupation. Board Member and Owner/partner current occupations are not 
included due to low variability. Controls for column (1) and column (2) are; Log of Sales is the 
natural logarithm of sales; Growth is the yearly change in sales; Leverage is total liabilities over total 
assets; Lag loss is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm has recorded a loss in the previous 
year; Return over Assets is EBIT over total assets. Standard errors clustered at firm level are 
presented beneath the coefficients, within parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Chapter 1                                             
 
 
 
67 
1.C Figures 
 Figure 1.1 - Percentage of Women Directors and CEOs   
of Norwegian Public Limited Companies in our sample 
 
 
Notes to Figure 1.1: Data is from Norwegian Business Register for the 81 firms in our sample 
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Figure 1.2 – Number of total entrants and number of entrants by Gender in 
Norwegian Public Limited Companies in our sample 
 
 
Notes to Figure 1.2: Data is from Norwegian Business Register for the 81 firms in our sample.
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Gender differences in risk aversion: 
Evidence from a multiple choice exam of 
accounting students 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Regulators around the world are pushing for an increment in the participation of 
females in corporate governance, including affirmative action policies as quotas on 
Boards of Directors. Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Spain and The 
Netherlands have issued policies or have set recommendations toward increasing 
gender diversity on corporate governance. In November 2012, the European 
Union’s Commissioners approved a plan forcing companies listed in the EU to 
reserve at least 40 percent of their boards seats for women by 2020 (Deloitte [2013]). 
In general, these regulations aim to increase the presence of females on executive 
and non-executive positions arguing that gender diversity have positive effects 
over corporate governance. Proponents of such regulations maintain that females 
have specific managerial skills and preferences that complement those of their 
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male counterparts, as documented by Eagly and Johnson [1990] and Adams and 
Ferreira [2009]. Experimental evidence show that females are more selfless (Eckel 
and Grossman [1998]), more socially oriented (Eckel and Grossman [2008]) and less 
competitively inclined than their male counterparts (Croson and Gneezy [2009]). 
Moreover, these gender differences in skills and preferences have material effects 
over individual performance. For example, females tend to outperform males in 
reading comprehension, but underperform males in mathematics (Hedges and 
Nowell [1995]; Goldin et al. [2006]). The origin of these differences is also debated. 
Some scholars argue that these differences in outcomes are related to innate 
differences between men and women, while others maintain that these differences 
may be shaped by the environment through culture and social learning (Guiso et 
al. [2008]; Hyde and Mertz [2009]; Strauss and Strauss [2009]; Gong and Yang 
[2012]; Booth et al. [2014]). 
Even though regulators have focused on the documented positive aspects of 
gender diversity in corporate governance, few references are made by policy 
makers to the existence and effects of gender differences in risk aversion. 
Preferences over risk are central in any decision process, as many economic 
interactions involve some type of risk (Charness and Gneezy [2012]). Previous 
literature shows that different attitudes toward risk may have material effects over 
firm’s outcomes, e.g. on investing decisions (Miller [1977]). Thus, the goal of this 
chapter is to analyze whether females differ systematically in their exhibited risk 
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aversion with respect to males and, more specifically, to explore whether these 
differences are rooted in gender specific factors (i.e. the nature argument) or can be 
shaped by cultural and social factors (i.e. the nurture argument). 
The common stereotype indicates that women are more risk averse than 
males. Researchers generally find evidence supporting the argument of females 
taking less risk; however, studies focused on particular groups of individuals—
highly skilled, like managers—tend to find inconclusive results (Croson and 
Gneezy [2009]). Moreover, most of the prior evidence about gender differences in 
risk aversion has been obtained from laboratory experiments. These laboratory 
experiments are designed by researchers to answer a specific set of research 
questions. Hence, one of the major drawbacks of experiments is the difficulty of 
comparing results among them, since decision problems faced by participants are 
not constant through experiments. Also, participants of experiments may have 
different personal characteristics with respect of the general population. Finally, 
some scholars raise concerns about a possible selection bias of experiments with 
positive results in terms of reporting gender differences in risk aversion (Charness 
and Gneezy [2012]). 
To overcome some of the drawbacks related to laboratory experiments, in 
this study we use a natural experiment. In particular, we use a multiple choice 
exam of the course “Introduction to Accounting”, common to all first year students 
at a large Spanish public university, to study whether females and males with 
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similar characteristics differ on their attitudes toward risk. Given that wrong 
answers are penalized, risk averse students focus more on the negative effects of a 
wrong answer over the final score, whereas risk neutral or risk lover students put 
more weight on the positive effects of answering a question right. 
Our data presents the following attributes: first, we have data for an 
important number of individuals (3,383 observations) facing the same decision 
problem; second, participation in the exam is mandatory, precluding selection bias 
of participants; third, the decision problem faced by an individual in our sample 
has material effects over his/her personal welfare; finally, we have collected a set 
of personal information regarding respondents to study the mitigation of gender 
differences due to nurture factors. We take advantage of this setting to provide 
robust evidence about whether women and men differ systematically in their 
preferences over risk, and whether these differences can be mitigated—or 
exacerbated—due to cultural or environmental factors. 
Our results provide evidence that, in our setting, females tend to be more 
risk averse than males. Also, some personal characteristics seem to mitigate these 
differences. In particular, we do not find evidence of gender differences in risk 
aversion among highly skilled individuals. We identify highly skilled individuals 
as those with higher Scores in the University’s entry exam and students enrolled in 
double-degrees. Overall, our study provides support to the argument that females 
tend to be more risk averse than males. However, our results are also consistent 
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with the findings of Gneezy et al. [2009] and Gong and Yang [2012], that gender 
differences in risk aversion are mitigated among highly skilled individuals. This 
evidence can be interpreted in line with the nurture argument about the mitigating 
role exerted by the environment (through culture, social interaction or education) 
over risk attitudes. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section two presents the literature 
review and discusses the research hypotheses; Section three describes the setting, 
the collected data and our main variables; Section four reports results from our 
univariate and multivariate analysis; Section five discusses the results and 
concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
2.2.1 Literature review 
The observed gender differences in several domains, including labor, investing 
and consumption have drawn the attention of regulators and scholars. One of the 
explanations for these observed differences is that females seem to have different 
skills or preferences than males. Males, on average, outperform females in math 
and science, while females outperform males in reading comprehension (Hedges 
and Nowell [1995]; Goldin et al. [2006]). The origin of these differences is subject of 
debate itself. Some scholars highlight the importance of biological factors—i.e. the 
nature argument—as an explanation for gender differences in skills (Strauss and 
Chapter 2                       
 
 
 
74 
Strauss [2009]). However, other scholars have noted that these differences in skills 
tend to revert in countries with higher levels of gender–equal culture (Guiso et al. 
[2008]; Hyde and Mertz [2009]; Nosek et al. [2009]). These authors support the 
thesis that gender differences in skills are influenced by nurturing. 
The evidence of the effects of gender differences in skills and preferences are 
also observed in corporate governance. Eagly and Johnson [1990] show that female 
executives tend to lead more democratically and have a more participative style of 
leadership as compared to their male counterparts. In the same vein, Tate and 
Yang [2014], using data on workers displaced after the closure of plants, find that 
women in leadership positions cultivate more female-friendly cultures inside their 
firms. Also, Matsa and Miller [2014] provide evidence that female manager are less 
likely to lay off workers during recessions. Finally, Huang and Kisgen [2013] 
provide evidence that male managers are more overconfident than their female 
counterparts, and this overconfidence is associated with lower returns on 
investments and debt issues. Regarding financial information, Barua et al. [2010] 
and Francis et al. [2014] provide evidence that female CFO’s are more likely to 
produce financial reports of higher quality. In the case of gender diverse board of 
directors, scholars find that the presence of females on boards has a positive 
impact in terms of better attendance to meetings by male members (Adams and 
Ferreira [2009]). Females prefer to sit on monitoring committees on these gender 
diverse boards, exerting higher levels of monitoring compared with less gender 
Chapter 2                       
 
 
 
75 
diverse boards. This is consistent with the effects over financial reporting of gender 
diverse boards (Srinidhi et al. [2011]; Abbott et al. [2012]) However, Adams and 
Funk [2012] provide evidence that, although female board members are more 
benevolent and concerned about universalism, but less power oriented than male 
directors, they are less tradition and security oriented and more risk loving than 
their male counterparts. With respect of group dynamics, Apesteguia et al. [2012] 
find that, in a lab experiment involving undergraduate and MBA students in a 
large business game, gender diverse teams outperform groups composed only by 
members of the same gender. 
Despite the observed positive effects of gender diversity, scholars have also 
documented difficulties for females to reach top positions, a phenomenon 
described as the glass ceiling effect. Evidence of these difficulties for females to 
reach top positions is documented in different settings, as leading positions in 
orchestras (Goldin and Rouse [2000]) or academic promotion (Wennerås and Wold 
[1997]). From a corporate governance point of view, Westphal and Stern [2006] and 
[2007] provide evidence of an apparent discrimination of females in the access to 
Boards of Directors. Moreover, Bertrand and Hallock [2000], Bertrand et al. [2010] 
and Kulich et al. [2011] provide evidence of a gender gap on executive 
compensations. Taken together, both the objective evidence of positive effects of 
gender diversity on corporate governance and difficulties faced by women to reach 
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top positions have increasingly fostered political action toward gender equality in 
corporations. 
 However, some scholars argue that female under-representation in 
corporate governance is associated with gender differences in risk aversion (Booth 
et al. [2014]). Regarding corporate governance, risk preferences are a key issue 
since different attitudes toward risk exert material effects over firm’s outcomes, 
e.g. on investing decisions (Miller [1977]). Moreover, some scholars argue that part 
of the difficulties faced by women to access top positions are originated by 
observed gender differences in risk aversion (Bertrand [2011]; Azmat and 
Petrongolo [2014]). Gender bias on risk aversion appears consistently on different 
settings, for example when choosing objective probability lotteries with known 
probabilities and dollar outcomes (Eckel and Grossman [2008]) or deciding to enter 
in competitions (Croson and Gneezy [2009]). However, these findings are not 
conclusive: gender differences in attitudes toward risk depend upon the 
composition of the group of study. In particular, gender differences in risk 
aversion seem to be mitigated within highly skilled individuals. This conflict 
between gender differences in risk aversion and group of study is also linked to 
the aforementioned theories explaining the origin of these differences: the nature 
versus nurture arguments. 
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2.2.2 Hypotheses development 
Both the nurture and nature arguments provide explanations to the origin of 
gender differences in risk aversion. According to the nature arguments, risk 
preferences are innate and, therefore, females tend to differ on their preferences 
regarding risk with respect of males because of nature-linked reasons. Sapienza et 
al. [2009] support this argument, as they show that there is a negative relationship 
between the level of testosterone (highly present on males) and risk aversion on a 
sample of MBA students. Croson and Gneezy [2009] offer three explanations 
supporting the nature argument: 1) emotions; 2) overconfidence; and 3) risk as 
challenge or threat. 
 The first explanation is related to the different feelings experienced by 
women regarding negative outcomes. There is evidence about women showing 
more intense nervousness and fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes 
(Fujita et al. [1991]). Thus, if women, compared to men, experience worse emotions 
against negative outcomes it seems reasonable to expect they will be more risk 
averse when facing risky situations.  
 The second explanation for gender differences in risk preferences is related 
to the degree of confidence. There is evidence showing that men are more 
overconfident in their success in uncertain situations (Lundeberg et al. [1994]). 
More specifically, prior research shows that men are more confident than women 
in investment decisions (Estes and Hosseini [1988], Huang and Kisgen [2013]), in 
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statistical estimations (Soll and Klayman [2004]) and in solving mathematical 
problems (Niederle and Vesterlund [2010]). Therefore, if men are more 
overconfident than women when facing uncertain decisions it can be expected they 
will be less risk averse than women. 
 Finally, the third explanation about gender differences in risk preferences is 
the interpretation of a risky situation. According to Arch [1993], males are more 
likely to see a risky situation as a challenge that calls for participation, while 
females perceive the same situation as a threat to avoid. This explanation is more 
related to differences in motivations than in skills, but in any case, it is supporting 
the nature argument around gender differences in risk preferences. 
Given the previous discussion, linked to the nature argument, our first 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1: Females are more risk averse than males 
 However, according to the so-called nurture argument, gender differences 
in risk preferences may be shaped by the environment. Put in other words, the 
abovementioned gender differences in risk aversion might actually reflect social 
learning, educational levels or particular skills. Actually, in managerial and 
professional settings there is evidence about smaller (often nonexistent) gender 
differences in risk aversion (Adams and Funk [2012]). In the same vein, scholars 
have provided evidence that gender differences in skills are mitigated in more 
gender egalitarian countries (Guiso et al. [2008]; Gneezy et al. [2009];  Nosek et al. 
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[2009]; Hyde and Mertz [2009]; Alesina et al. [2013]). Specifically, differences in the 
type and amount of education received affect agents’ behavior, whereas more 
egalitarian environments are associated with a better access to education for 
females (Buchmann et al. [2008]). In terms of risk aversion, Gneezy et al. [2009] and 
Gong and Yang [2012] also support the nurture argument, as they show that 
females tend to be less risk averse than males in a matriarchal society. Using a 
sample of first year colleague students, Booth et al. [2014] provide evidence that 
female risk aversion is mitigated in a single-sex class environment. Overall, these 
authors conclude that female oriented environments, or where females tend to 
dominate, mitigate gender differences in risk aversion. This mitigation in gender 
difference in risk aversion is associated with personal characteristics, acquired in, 
or shaped by, these more egalitarian environments. Consequently, we expect that, 
conditional on the nurture argument, gender differences in risk aversion might be 
shaped by personal characteristics of respondents, and that these personal 
characteristics will reduce the gender gap in risk preferences. We state this 
research expectation in our second hypothesis: 
H2: Personal characteristics, such as the level of education and skills, mitigate 
gender differences in risk aversion 
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2.3 Sample and research design 
2.3.1 Data 
Scholars have documented the existence and extent of gender differences in risk 
aversion using mostly laboratory settings. However, this approach presents some 
difficulties in term of external validity. In particular, experiments present 
variations in the methods used to study relationship between gender and risk 
aversion. Also, individuals participating on these experiments are not necessarily 
randomly selected from the general population. Finally, some scholars argue that 
there is a publication bias of experiments with a positive finding in terms of gender 
differences in risk aversion (Charness and Gneezy [2012]). For all these reasons we 
exploit a natural experiment using the results of a multiple choice exam. 
Our sample consists of 3,383 students taking the final exam of the course 
“Introduction to Accounting”, a first year course common to several 
undergraduate degrees from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. The sample 
corresponds to scores recorded during the years 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011.1 The 
exam is of the multiple choice type, where each question has four possible 
answers. A correct answer yields 1 point, whereas an incorrect answer yields -0.33 
point. A blank answer yields 0 points. Hence, answering a question choosing 
randomly among available options yields an expected payoff of 0. Although every 
year the exam has two different types (A and B), both types include the same 
questions, being the only difference among the exams’ types the ordering of the 
                                                          
1 The information for the year 2009 is not available. 
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questions. We assume that this change in the order of the questions do not affect 
the outcome of the exam, given that on both types the questions do not follow any 
given pattern. 2 The exam contains 40 questions and students have two and a half 
hours to complete it. The exam answers are filled in a special answer sheet so that 
exams are scored by a computer, which determines the final score mechanically 
based on the sum of points obtained in the exam. 
Multiple choice exams are a widely used educational tool. It precludes 
measurement errors from the grader in the scoring process, and guarantees a 
wider sampling on the course content. However, multiple choice exams may 
encourage guessing, adding noise to the student’s evaluation of knowledge. To 
control for this guessing, multiple choice exams include penalties for wrong 
answers. In particular, multiple choice questions with controls for guessing are a 
proxy for lotteries with an expected payoff. Although widely used, there is scarce 
literature analyzing optimal behavior in multiple choice exams (Bernardo [1998]; 
Burgos [2004]; Espinosa and Gardeazabal [2005]). Optimal behavior when 
answering the exam depends on various factors, including scoring rules and 
personal attributes. These personal attributes may have different origins, from 
nature to nurture. Hence, multiple choice exams provide an interesting setting 
where observed differences in personal attributes may affect agents’ behavior. 
                                                          
2 Marín and Rosa-García [2011] use a similar setting than us, but in their case the multiple choice 
questions do not follow a random order, that is, the order of the questions  follow the course 
contents.  
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More important, these differences can be measured, and linked to preferences over 
risk. 
The original sample is composed of 4,023 students. We eliminate from our 
sample observations using the following criteria: students with missing 
information regarding scores in the final exam, lack of information about which 
group he/she belongs to, unique id number or regarding the Group’s professor 
survey. We also drop students retaking the exam, to avoid the effects of learning 
processes that may bias risk attitudes in solving the exam for a second time. The 
final sample is composed of 3,383 students/observations that fulfill the previous 
criteria. 
2.3.2 Variables and research design 
For each student in our sample we record Gender, Age, City of Origin, Score in the 
University’s Entry Exam and Grade Point Average (thereafter GPA).3 Students in our 
sample are grouped into two different clusters: Class and Group. Class 
encompasses students sharing theoretical classes (Lectures), whereas the cluster 
Group encompasses students sharing practical classes (Tutorials). Each class is 
split into several Groups; therefore, the number of students per Group is smaller 
than the number of students per Class. The level of interaction among students is 
higher at the Group level, as students have to team up for certain assignments with 
other students within the same Group. Also, students are more likely to observe 
                                                          
3 Grade Point Average is the average of the final grades earned over time. For each student, we 
observe his/her GPA available at the moment of data collection, namely 2013. 
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qualitative attributes of their fellow classmates at the Group level, given that they 
are usually asked for activities on the blackboard in practical classes. Each Class 
and Group evaluates the works of the correspondent professors at the end of the 
term, but before the exam. 
The final score of the course is composed by three different elements: 
course-work assessment (score assigned by the professor of the Group, including 
scores from different types of assignments and other subjective elements as 
participation in class), score in a mid-term exam and score in the final exam. To 
pass the course, students should have a final score of 5 (out of ten) or higher. In the 
final score, 20 percent corresponds to the course-work assessment, 20 percent to 
the midterm exam and 60 percent to the final exam. Before taking the final exam, 
students know their scores in the course-work assessment and in the mid-term 
exam. We therefore refer to the sum of the course-work assessment and the mid-
term exam as the “continuous evaluation”. The importance of the final exam for 
the final score in the course is also reflected, in Table 2.3, by the correlation 
between both variables: 0.915, whereas the correlation between the continuous 
evaluation and the final score is 0.753. However, the correlation between the 
continuous evaluation and the final exam score is comparably low, 0.437. We 
interpret these correlations as an assessment of the importance of the final exam to 
pass the course. 
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Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in our study. The 
number of observations is evenly distributed in terms of gender (53 percent 
females, 47 percent males)4 but not in terms of year observations: 63 percent of 
observations are evenly distributed on the years 2007 and 2008, whereas the rest of 
the observations are distributed between the years 2010 and 2011. The average age 
of students is 19.5 years (females 19.4, males 19.7), and 76 percent of the sample are 
students from the Madrid area. The average score for a student in the sample is 
5.15 (a 5 is required to pass the exam). Females’ average score is 5.18 and males’ 
average score is 5.11. This difference is not statistically significant using a mean 
comparison test. 
To test our first hypothesis we use the following specification: 
Risk Proxy = β1 + β2Gender + γ3Controls + ε  (1) 
Where our proxy for risk aversion is the number of blank questions left in 
the exam. As described before, risk averse students are more likely to focus on the 
negative consequences of a wrong answer over the final score; hence, they are 
more likely to leave more blank answers. Gender is an indicator variable of the 
gender of the student (1 for females, 0 for males). The variable Controls includes a 
set of control variables: We control for Local—a dichotomous variable for whether 
the student is originally from the province where the University is located 
(Madrid)—students from outside the community of Madrid are more likely to 
                                                          
4 There is a small female bias with respect of the general population in Spain. In 2007, 50.6 percent 
of the population was female versus 53 percent in our sample. 
Chapter 2                       
 
 
 
85 
have different nurturing factors than students from the community of Madrid, e.g. 
they are more independent with respect to their families. Hence, we use Local as a 
factor that can mitigate gender differences in risk aversion; Age—older or younger 
than 21 years old, dichotomous variable—; Score in the University’s Entry Exam; 
GPA, and, finally, student´s score in the Continuous Evaluation process. We include 
year fixed effects and errors are clustered at the Group level. 
To test our second hypothesis we use a modified version of our baseline 
model (1). In particular, we assume that students with high Scores in the 
University´s Entry Exam and higher GPA are less likely to be affected by gender 
biases, as these variables are proxies for students being raised in more gender 
egalitarian environments. Hence, we include in model (1) an interaction term of the 
aforementioned variables with Gender. A negative and significant coefficient of the 
interaction variable Gender and Score in the University’s Entry Exam or the 
interaction variable Gender and GPA is interpreted as evidence that more skilled 
females have different risk aversion than their male counterparts. Furthermore, as 
an alternative test for hypothesis two, we re-estimate model (1) for each quartile of 
scores in the final exam. As described before, males are more likely to see a risky 
situation as a challenge that calls for participation. Therefore, when the decision is 
more costly, i.e. answering a question wrong may induce failing the exam, men are 
more likely to answer a question in the exam than women. Hence, if females are 
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more risk averse than males in our setting, this difference should be more evident 
in the lower quartiles of the distribution of scores in the final exam. 
Finally, we take advantage of the heterogeneity of students’ characteristics 
conditional on the type of degrees in our sample to provide an additional test for 
hypothesis two. In particular, we use as an identification strategy for highly skilled 
students those enrolled in double-degrees (for example the degree in Business and 
Law). Entry requirements for these degrees are more stringent than for single-
degrees (only Business, or only Law). In particular, the average Score in the 
University’s Entry Exam is 9.8 for double-degrees students versus 7.36 for single-
degree students. Moreover, 35 percent of students of the double-degree are from 
outside the Madrid area, versus 21 percent of students of the single-degree. Hence, 
we re-estimate model (1) for two subsamples: students enrolled in double-degrees, 
and students enrolled in single-degrees. 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Univariate analysis 
Figure 2.1 presents the density of scores in the final exam by gender. In terms of 
scores, there is a higher density of females with respect to males around the score 
5, which is the pass/fail threshold. Moreover, there is more density of male 
students with scores below 4 than females. There is no observed differences 
between females and males on the higher scores levels. This higher density of 
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females around the pass/fail threshold and higher density of males in lower scores 
is consistent with the observed difference in average scores between females and 
males reported in Table 2.2. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present, respectively, the density distribution and 
histogram of the number of blank answers left in the exam conditional on gender. 
These graphs provide evidence that males tend, in general, to leave less blank 
questions in the exam than females. Differences tend to disappear after 10 blank 
answers, which represents 25 percent of the exam. A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
rejects the null hypothesis of equality among cumulative distributions. In Table 2.4 
we more directly address whether these differences between men and women that 
we already observe in the graphical evidence is actually significant using a 
univariate test. The difference between the number of answers left blank by 
females and males is significant (0.574; p < 0.01). Hence, the univariate analysis 
allow us to infer that, indeed, females tend to be more risk averse than males in 
this setting. 
Next, we turn to test whether this difference in risk aversion is clustered 
around certain areas of the distribution of the scores. As Croson and Gneezy [2009] 
discuss, among talented and highly skilled individuals, gender differences are less 
likely to appear. Hence, it is less likely to observe gender differences in the number 
of blank questions left in the exam in the upper quartiles of the final exam’s score 
distribution. On the other hand, given that a wrongly answered question may 
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induce failing the exam for the students in the lower quartiles of the final exam 
scores distribution, this situation can be interpreted as exacerbating risk aversion. 
To test this argument, we conduct univariate analyses that we present in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6. 
Table 2.5 presents evidence consistent with our assumption that among 
skilled individuals, gender differences disappear, since we do not find evidence of 
gender differences in the number of blank questions left in the exam in the upper 
quartiles of the score distribution. Also, Table 2.5 shows that in cases where the 
cost of answering a question wrongly is higher—i.e. the risk of failing the exam is 
high—females tend to be more risk averse than males. In Table 2.6 we present the 
same analysis but using as a proxy for skills the University entry exam scores. The 
correlation between the final exam score and the University entry exam score is 
relatively low (0.221) and, hence, we assume that the University entry exam score 
is a good measure of skills not fully captured by the final exam’s score.5 Results in 
Table 2.6 are consistent with our assumption that gender differences in risk 
aversion are not observed among highly skilled individuals, as females with higher 
University entry exam score leave on average the same number of blank questions 
in the exam as their male counterparts. Jointly, we interpret the results of the 
univariate tests as evidence that, in our setting, females have higher level of risk 
                                                          
5 Other variable that is related to general skills is the GPA of the student, that has higher correlation 
with the exam’s final score (0.543) than the University’s entry exam score, and, hence, can be 
capturing the same information as the final exam’s score. 
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aversion than males, but females tend to behave similar to males when they are 
highly skilled. In the next Section we turn to the multivariate analysis of our data. 
2.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
In Table 2.7, we present the results of the baseline regression using our model (1). 
The dependent variable is our proxy for risk aversion, namely the number of blank 
questions left in the exam. To tests hypothesis one, the independent variables are 
the gender of respondents and a set of controls. As a first test of hypothesis two, 
the last column of Table 2.7 includes the interaction between Gender and Scores in 
the Entry Exam and GPA.  
 Results from Table 2.7 present consistent evidence with hypothesis one 
(women being more risk averse), as the coefficient for the variable Gender is 
positive and significant, through model specifications 1 to 3, (coefficients 0.640, p < 
0.01; 0.620, p < 0.01; 0.771, p < 0.01, respectively). Results are robust to the 
inclusion of control variables for personal characteristics, as Age or Province of 
Origin, and proxies for skills, as Score in the University Entry Exam and GPA. 
However, when the interaction term Score in the Entry Exam and Gender is 
included, significance of the Gender dummy drops (coeff. 1.735; p < 0.10) and the 
interaction term is negative and weakly significant (coeff. -0.169; p < 0.10). We 
interpret this result as evidence that highly skilled females, using as a proxy for 
skills Score in the University Entry Exam, are more likely to have, in our setting, 
similar risk preferences with respect to their male counterparts, consistent with our 
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second hypothesis. The included controls, apart from the dummy for Province of 
origin, are significant across specifications and risk aversion. 
In Table 2.8 and 2.10 we provide further tests for hypothesis two. In 
particular, we test whether the results supporting hypothesis one—gender 
differences in risk aversion—are consistent along the distribution of skills. First, we 
use the distribution of scores in the final exam as a proxy for skills. To that end, we 
split the sample in four quartiles given the distribution of the scores in the final 
exam, and repeat the tests of column (3) of Table 2.7 for each quartile. Our results, 
presented in Table 2.8, provide robust evidence that women are more risk averse 
than men when they are in the Quartile2 of the score distribution (coeff. 1.008; p < 
0.01). Students in Quartile2 have a mean score in the final exam of 4.6 points (below 
the pass—5—threshold). Hence, in this particular quartile, a wrong answer implies 
the difference between a pass and a fail. This result provides also support to the 
argument that gender differences in risk aversion are more likely to occur among 
people with normal skills instead of highly skilled people. In unreported results, 
we repeat the analyses conducted in Table 2.8, but splitting the sample this time in 
four quartiles given the distribution of the scores in the continuous evaluation 
process and course’s final score. We do not observe significant coefficients for the 
interaction term in any quartile of the distribution of the score in the continuous 
evaluation or in the course’s final score. In these cases, females tend to leave more 
blank questions than males independently of their position in these two scores’ 
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distribution. However, both scores in the course and in the continuous evaluation 
are not perfectly correlated with score in the final exam. Hence, we interpret that it 
is more difficult to match students’ perception of relative costs and answering 
strategies with the aforementioned variables. 
As described before, our sample is composed by students from different 
degrees. These degrees have different entry requirement (e.g. a degree in Law and 
Economics has higher entry requirements that a single-degree). Table 2.9 presents 
descriptive statistics of both types of degrees. The mean score in the University 
entry exam is 2.5 higher for students in double-degrees versus single-degrees (p < 
0.01); also, students in double-degrees are less likely to be from the same state as 
the University, as 35 percent of double-degrees students come from outside of the 
province of Madrid, whereas only 21 percent of single-degrees students come from 
outside the state. We interpret this evidence as supporting the argument that 
students from double-degrees are more skilled than their single-degrees 
counterparts. Table 2.10 presents the results of model (1) estimated separately by 
single or double-degrees. Consistent with our previous findings, women in 
double-degrees present similar levels of risk aversion than men, as the Gender 
variable is not significant at conventional levels. Also, we find evidence that female 
students from single-degrees are more likely to exhibit higher levels of risk 
aversion than their male counterparts (coeff. 0.857; p < 0.01).  
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As a robustness test of our findings, we perform the previous study—the 
effect of belonging to a particular degree, single or double,-majors on gender 
differences in risk aversion—on the subsample of students above or below the 
median of the scores in the final exam. The objective of this analysis is to control 
for the possibility that students in the double-degrees are, on average, less likely to 
face costly decisions. Results for both tests are presented in Table 2.11. Columns 
(A) and (B) from Table 2.11 present results consistent with our previous findings 
that females show a similar behavior than males within the double-degrees, 
independent of their position in the score’s distribution, as the variable of interest 
(Gender) is not statistically significant. However, female students from single-
degrees show higher levels of risk aversion than their male counterparts. Table 
2.11, columns (C) and (D), show that females on single-degrees leave consistently 
more blank answers than their male counterparts, both below the median score 
(coeff. 0.871; p < 0.01) and above the median score (coeff. 0.580; p < 0.05).  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The existence of gender differences in risk taking is a controversial topic. The 
general idea of women being more risk averse than men is largely based on gender 
innate characteristics such as emotions, overconfidence or interpretations of risky 
situations. This traditional vision of women as more risk averse than their male 
counterparts given their gender inherent traits falls into the so-called nature 
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arguments. This perspective, however, has been challenged by other arguments 
suggesting that gender differences in risk aversion can be shaped by the 
environment, i.e. the nurture argument. Educational levels, skills development or 
social learning might mitigate the gender gap in risk preferences.  
 Despite the lack of consensus on this issue, little empirical evidence exists 
on the factors that explain gender differences in risk aversion. In general, the 
empirical evidence provided by the literature analyzing the gender gap in risk 
preferences is limited by issues associated with the research design, as problems 
with the external validity of lab experiments. These limitations in the empirical 
evidence also limit the study of competing theoretical arguments explaining 
gender differences in risk aversion. Our study advances the knowledge on this 
issue by taking advantage of a natural experiment approach, which allows us 
testing both the nurture and the nature argument explaining the gender gap. 
Moreover, our setting provides identification strategies to identify individuals who 
are more likely to be affected by risky decisions. It also allows us to compare 
individuals across the distribution of abilities and skills. 
The empirical analysis is performed on a large sample of students taking a 
final multiple choice exam from the course “Introduction to Accounting”, common 
to all first year students from the Social Science area from Universidad Carlos III 
de Madrid. We use the fact that wrong answers in the exam are penalized as a 
proxy for risk aversion. Moreover, we collect personal characteristics of students to 
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test whether these gender differences in risk aversion are explained by these 
personal characteristics. This dataset provides a suitable setting to test our 
hypotheses; this is especially worthy given empirical evidence from field data is 
still scarce. 
 In line with the traditional nature arguments, our unconditional results 
indicate that—in our particular setting—women are more risk averse than men. 
However, when controlling for observable personal characteristics these gender 
differences are mitigated, as stated in our second hypothesis. Even more, gender 
differences are not significant when we focus on the best students (those with high 
marks in their University entry exams, and with high marks in the multiple choice 
test). This result is coherent with the arguments of Gneezy et al. [2009], Adams and 
Ferreira [2009] and Gong and Yang [2012] that in settings where females are highly 
skilled—or are not affected by nurture limitations—they are more likely to exhibit 
similar risk preferences as their male counterparts. 
These findings contribute to the current debate about whether policies 
should be issued to foster gender equality (e.g. affirmative action policies, as 
quotas) as we show that some gender differences in risk aversion are still present 
after controlling for observable proxies of skill and personal characteristics. 
Moreover, we provide evidence that these differences are related to the relative 
cost of a wrong answer. 
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One indirect implication of our results for the debate around the effects of 
imposing gender quotas is that, if there is a lack of suitable candidates to fulfill the 
quota, attention should be pay to the fact that new board members, appointed 
because of quotas, can be subjects with intrinsically different risk preferences than 
the pre-quota candidates. If managerial teams and boards of directors are 
endogenously determined by firms, and firms choose optimally the level of risk 
aversion of their executives and directors, constrains over these optimal levels of 
risk aversion may have material effects over firm’s outcomes.    
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2.B Tables 
 
Table 2.1 - Descriptive Statistics of variables of study 
 
Mean SD p25 p50 p75 Min Max 
Gender 0.528 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Blank 6.570 4.870 3.000 6.000 10.000 0.000 28.000 
Score 5.150 1.880 3.930 5.090 6.420 0.000 10.000 
Grade 6.010 1.530 5.000 6.000 7.000 0.100 10.000 
Local 0.763 0.425 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Age 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Entry 7.910 2.200 6.510 7.610 9.140 0.000 13.700 
GPA 5.920 1.620 5.400 6.200 6.900 0.000 9.800 
Cont Eva 7.290 1.590 6.480 7.490 8.370 1.000 10.000 
Professor 4.140 0.587 3.680 4.270 4.640 2.750 5.000 
Group 
Gender 
0.528 0.110 0.464 0.531 0.603 0.133 0.895 
Notes to Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in our study. Gender is a dummy 
variable taking value one if female, zero otherwise; Blank is the number of blank questions left in 
the exam; Score is the score obtained in the final exam; Grade is the final grade in the course; Local is 
a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is the same autonomous community as the 
University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous variable taking value one if older than 
21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the University entry exam; GPA is the grade point 
average; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous evaluation process, before the exam; Professor is the 
score obtained by the Group professor on the students’ survey before the exam; Group Gender is the 
proportion of females by Group.  
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Table 2.2 – Mean values of variable of interest, by Gender 
 Gender 
 
Females Males 
Blank 6.840 6.270 
Score 5.180 5.110 
Grade 6.050 5.970 
Local 0.760 0.767 
Age 0.094 0.132 
Entry 8.070 7.730 
GPA 6.070 5.760 
Cont Eva 7.350 7.220 
Professor 4.160 4.110 
Observations   
Notes to Table 2.2: Mean values of variable of interest by Gender. Blank is the number of blank 
questions left in the exam; Score is the score obtained in the final exam; Grade is the final grade in 
the course; Local is a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is the same autonomous 
community as the University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous variable taking value 
one if older than 21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the University entry exam; GPA 
is the grade point average; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous evaluation process, before the 
exam; Professor is the score obtained by the Group professor on the students’ survey before the 
exam.  
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Table 2.3 – Correlation Matrix 
a b c d e f g h i j k 
a – Gender  1.000 
          b – Blank  0.059 1.000 
         c – Score 0.018 -0.492 1.000 
        d – Grade 0.029 -0.461 0.915 1.000 
       e – Local -0.008 0.035 -0.054 -0.052 1.000 
      f – Age -0.060 -0.030 0.023 0.006 0.022 1.000 
     g – Entry 0.078 -0.092 0.221 0.219 -0.092 -0.242 1.000 
    h – GPA  0.094 -0.237 0.543 0.596 -0.023 -0.097 0.343 1.000 
   i – Cont Eva 0.039 -0.226 0.437 0.753 -0.027 -0.008 0.118 0.460 1.000 
  j – Professor 0.044 -0.030 0.052 0.095 -0.007 0.028 0.070 0.035 0.139 1.000 
 k – Group Gender 0.221 0.023 0.047 0.085 -0.032 -0.012 0.124 0.099 0.114 0.245 1.000 
Notes to Table 2.3: Correlation matrix of the variables use in our study. Pair wise correlations 
significant at five percent or higher in bold letter. Gender is a dummy variable taking value one if 
female, zero otherwise; Blank is the number of blank questions left in the exam; Score is the score 
obtained in the final exam; Grade is the final grade in the course; Local is a dichotomous value taking 
value one if origin is the same autonomous community as the University (Madrid), zero otherwise; 
Age is a dichotomous variable taking value one if older than 21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is 
the score in the University entry exam; GPA is the grade point average; Cont Eva is the score in the 
continuous evaluation process, before the exam; Professor is the score obtained by the Group 
professor on the students’ survey before the exam; Group Gender is the proportion of females by 
Group.  
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Table 2.4 - Descriptive Statistics of Blank Answers left in the Exam.  
Full sample and by Gender. 
 
 25 percent Median 75 percent Mean Std. Deviation Observations 
Full Sample 3 6 10 6.570 4.866 3383 
Females 3 6 10 6.840 4.881 1785 
Males 2 6 9 6.270 4.833 1598 
Difference    0.574***   
Notes to Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of blank answers left in the exam, for the full sample and by 
gender. Difference is computed using a t-test for equal means assuming equal variance. Significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Table 2.5 - Descriptive Statistics of Final Scores in the Exam and number of 
Blank Answers conditional by Quartile distribution of scores 
 in the Final Exam. 
 
Quartiles 1 2 3 4 
Mean Score 2.77 4.57 5.75 7.55 
Females – Blank 9.642 8.677 6.171 2.838 
Males – Blank  8.808 7.676 5.823 2.706 
Difference 0.835** 1.001*** 0.343 0.132 
Notes to Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics of the final score in the exam by quartiles and the 
correspondent mean value of the variable Blank Answers. Quartiles are defined using scores in the 
final exam. Quartile 1 encompasses the lowest scores in the final exam; Quartile 4 the highest 
scores. Difference is computed using a t-test for equal means assuming equal variance. Significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Table 2.6 - Descriptive Statistics of Scores in the University Entry Exam and number 
of Blank Answers conditional by Quartile distribution of scores 
 in the University Entry Exam. 
Quartiles 1 2 3 4 
Mean Score 5.47 7.07 8.33 10.78 
Females – Blank 8.035 7.187 5.954 6.514 
Males – Blank  6.975 6.081 5.813 5.997 
Difference 1.060*** 1.106*** 0.141 0.517 
Notes to Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics of scores in the University entry exam by quartiles and the 
correspondent mean value of the variable Blank Answers. Quartiles are defined using scores in the 
University’s entry exam. Quartile 1 encompasses the lowest scores; Quartile 4 encompasses the 
highest scores. Difference is computed using a t-test for equal means assuming same variance. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 – Regression. Dependent variable: 
Number of blank questions left in the exam. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gender 0.640*** 0.620*** 0.771*** 1.735* 
  (0.196) (0.198) (0.191) (0.883) 
Cont  Eva -0.658*** -0.658*** -0.347*** -0.346*** 
  (0.069) (0.070) (0.082) (0.082) 
Local   0.283 0.217 0.216 
    (0.229) (0.220) (0.219) 
Age   -0.553** -1.325*** -1.290*** 
    (0.278) (0.275) (0.219) 
Entry     -0.304*** -0.218*** 
      (0.058) (0.068) 
GPA     -0.464*** -0.495*** 
      (0.072) (0.081) 
Entry*Gender       -0.169* 
        (0.096) 
GPA*Gender       0.062 
        (0.109) 
Constant 11.603*** 11.448*** 13.861*** 13.359*** 
  (0.581) (0.654) (0.662) (0.781) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F - Statistics 29.38  22.83 32.15 27.98 
Adj-R Sqr 0.073 0.074 0.108 0.109 
Observations 3383 3383 3383 3383 
Notes to Table 2.7: Results from multivariate analysis. Dependent variable is the number of blank 
questions in the exam. Independent variables are: Gender is a dummy variable taking value one if 
female, zero otherwise; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous evaluation process, before the exam; 
Local is a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is the same autonomous community as the 
University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous variable taking value one if older than 
21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the University entry exam; GPA is the grade point 
average. Clustered standard errors by Group reported beneath the coefficients. Significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 – Regression by Quartiles of score in the Final Exam. Dependent 
variable: number of blank questions left in the exam. 
 
 
Quartile in the Exam 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gender 0.562 1.008*** 0.353 0.247 
  (0.374) (0.320) (0.258) (0.189) 
Cont Eva 0.051 0.061 -0.311** -0.365*** 
  (0.131) (0.144) (0.123) (0.087) 
Local -0.719 -0.050 0.402 0.310 
  (0.485) (0.412) (0.279) (0.199) 
Age -1.658*** 0.747 -0.577 -0.691*** 
  (0.557) (0.547) (0.497) (0.247) 
Entry -0.206* -0.260** -0.104 -0.085 
  (0.116) (0.124) (0.094) (0.061) 
GPA 0.047 0.289** 0.056 -0.342*** 
  (0.108) (0.126) (0.116) (0.085) 
Constant 10.314*** 7.333*** 8.529*** 8.865*** 
  (1.357) (1.433) (1.278) (0.742) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F - Statistics 6.47 3.82 4.71 16.79 
Adj-R Sqr 0.054 0.033 0.027 0.108 
Observations 855 845 840 843 
Notes to Table 2.8: Regression by Quartile of score in the final exam. Quartile (1) is the group of 
students with lower scores; Quartile (4) is the group of students with higher scores. Dependent 
variable: number of blank answers in the exam; independent variables: Gender is a dummy variable 
taking value one if female, zero otherwise; Local is a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is 
the same autonomous community as the University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous 
variable taking value one if older than 21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the 
University entry exam; GPA is the grade point average; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous 
evaluation process, before the exam. Clustered standard errors by Group reported beneath the 
coefficients. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2.9 – Descriptive statistics by type of Degree. 
 
 Double Degree Single Degree 
 Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std Dev 
Gender 0.548 1.000 0.498 0.522 1.000 0.500 
Blank 5.840 5.000 4.930 6.790 6.000 4.830 
Score 5.640 5.580 1.800 5.010 4.930 1.880 
Grade 6.350 6.300 1.470 5.910 5.900 1.530 
Local 0.653 1.000 0.476 0.795 1.000 0.404 
Age 0.016 0.000 0.124 0.140 0.000 0.347 
Entry 9.810 10.100 2.250 7.360 7.240 1.840 
GPA 6.530 6.600 1.120 5.740 6.100 1.700 
Eva Cont 7.370 7.610 1.590 7.260 7.490 1.580 
Professor 4.200 4.470 0.697 4.120 4.190 0.550 
Observations   766   2617 
Notes to Table 2.9: Descriptive statistics of variables of study by type of Degree. Gender is a dummy 
variable taking value one if female, zero otherwise; Blank is the number of blank questions left in 
the exam; Score is the score obtained in the final exam; Grade is the final grade in the course; Local is 
a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is the same autonomous community as the 
University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous variable taking value one if older than 
21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the University entry exam; GPA is the grade point 
average; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous evaluation process, before the exam; Professor is the 
score obtained by the Group professor on the students’ survey before the exam.  
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Table 2.10 – Regression by type of Degree. Dependent variable: 
Number of blank questions left in the exam. 
 
 
Double 
Degree 
Single 
Degree 
Gender 0.373 0.857*** 
  (0.428) (0.214) 
Cont Eva -0.168 -0.375*** 
  (0.188) (0.088) 
Local -0.433 0.400 
  (0.345) (0.279) 
Age -2.332 -1.348*** 
  (1.649) (0.273) 
Entry -0.039 -0.346*** 
  (0.096) (0.079) 
GPA -1.018*** -0.393*** 
  (0.231) (0.070) 
Constant 13.124*** 13.773*** 
  (1.879) (0.752) 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
F - Statistics 15.282 29.145 
Adj-R Sqr 0.098 0.111 
Observations 766 2617 
Notes to Table 2.10: Results from multivariate analysis by type of Degree. (1) is the regression for 
students in double majors; (2) is the regression for students in single majors. Dependent variable: 
number of Blank Answers in the exam; independent variable: Gender is a dummy variable taking 
value one if female, zero otherwise; Local is a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is the 
same autonomous community as the University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous 
variable taking value one if older than 21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the 
University entry exam; GPA is the grade point average; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous 
evaluation process, before the exam. Clustered standard errors by Group reported beneath the 
coefficients. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 2.11 – Regression by type of Degree and position 
with respect of the median of the Score in the Final Exam. 
Dependent variable: Number of blank questions left in the exam. 
 
 Double-Degree Single-Degree 
 
Below 
Med 
Above Med Below Med Above Med 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Gender 0.236 0.187 0.821*** 0.580** 
 
(0.537) (0.227) (0.289) (0.222) 
Cont Eva 0.160 -0.454*** -0.018 -0.494*** 
 (0.284) (0.126) (0.123) (0.110) 
Local -0.923 0.165 -0.142 0.532** 
 
(0.579) (0.302) (0.424) (0.218) 
Age -0.514 -1.667* -0.617 -1.136*** 
 
(2.378) (0.942) 0.442) (0.287) 
Entry -0.157 0.060 -0.250* -0.231*** 
 
(0.167) (0.129) (0.130) (0.073) 
GPA 0.022 -0.742*** 0.042 -0.316*** 
 
(0.301) (0.213) (0.088) (0.066) 
Constant 7.661*** 11.177*** 10.037*** 12.129*** 
 (2.612) (1.521) (1.351) (0.948) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F – Statistics 2.394 8.783 3.661 18.503 
Adj-R Sqr 0.046 0.132 0.027 0.117 
Observations 382 384 1313 1304 
Notes to Table 2.11: Multivariate analysis by Degrees, conditional on scores above or below the 
median score in the Final Exam, by type of Bachelor. (1) is the regression for students in double 
majors; (2) is the regression for students in single majors. Dependent variable: Blank Answers in the 
exam; independent variables: Gender is a dummy variable taking value one if female, zero 
otherwise; Local is a dichotomous value taking value one if origin is the same autonomous 
community as the University (Madrid), zero otherwise; Age is a dichotomous variable taking value 
one if older than 21 years old, zero otherwise; Entry is the score in the University entry exam; GPA 
is the grade point average; Cont Eva is the score in the continuous evaluation process, before the 
exam. Clustered standard errors by Group reported beneath the coefficients. Significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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2.C Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 - Density distribution of scores in the exam, by Gender. 
 
 
 
Notes to Figure 2.1: Density distribution of scores in the final exam of the course Introduction to 
Accounting, by gender. 
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Figure 2.2 – Density distribution of blank answers in the exam, by Gender. 
 
 
 
Notes to Figure 2.2: Density distribution of blank answers left in the final exam of the course 
Introduction to Accounting, by gender. 
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Figure 2.3 – Histogram of blank answers, females. 
 
 
 
Notes to Figure 2.3: Histogram of blank answers left in the final exam of the course Introduction to 
Accounting, by female students in our sample. 
 
  
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Blank Answers - Females
Chapter 2                       
 
 
 
109 
Figure 2.4 – Histogram of blank answers, males. 
 
 
 
Notes to Figure 2.4: Histogram of blank answers left in the final exam of the course Introduction to 
Accounting, by male students in our sample. 
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Blank Answers - Males
  
  
 
 
   
  
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
111 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Determinants of early compliance with 
gender quotas on boards: Evidence from the 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides evidence of the determinants of voluntary compliance with 
Gender Quotas. Gender diversity in corporate governance is increasingly 
becoming a central issue in the European political arena, as there is an increasing 
social attention to improve the mechanism of access of women to managerial and 
supervisory positions. This pressure takes different forms: Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy and Norway have imposed quotas on boards of directors; other 
countries like Spain and the United Kingdom issued recommendations toward an 
increment in gender diversity on boards. 
Firms face different incentives to fulfill these social pressures. From a 
theoretical point of view, under Resource Dependence Theory, a firm requires, as a 
strategy for survival, external resources (Pfeffer [1972]). In the same vein, 
Institutional Theory argues that access to these resources is primarily determined 
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by the firm’s external legitimacy, where legitimacy is defined as the degree to 
which a firm is merged with its institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 
[1977]). This external legitimacy is achieved, among other factors, through 
corporate governance in general, and the board of directors in particular (Pfeffer 
[1973]; Dowling and Pfeffer [1975]; Blum et al. [1994]; Luoma and Goodstein [1999]; 
Certo [2003]). This is because directors provide organizations with a pool of 
external resources through their professional and personal experiences, networks 
and human capital. Also, directors provide legitimacy, as the board of directors is a 
channel that the firm uses to merge with its institutional environment in exchange 
for legitimacy from societal members. 
Hillman et al. [2007] find evidence that, in unregulated settings, specific 
organizational characteristics affect the demand for external resources and drive 
the organization’s demand for external legitimacy. The authors find that big 
organizations, operating in industries with a high proportion of female workers, 
diversified operations and highly interlocked boards are more likely to include a 
female board member in the board. Hillman et al. [2007] find these results using a 
sample of US firms, where the appointment of female board members is 
unregulated. In the other extreme of the spectrum, on highly regulated 
environments with high enforcement (e.g. Norway), firms are force to include 
female board members, independently of firms’ characteristics. However, in the 
intermediate case where quotas are present, but not enforced, pressures toward 
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gender diversity are associated with firm characteristics. This intermediate case 
(quotas with low enforcement) provides complementary insights toward the 
determinants of gender diversity within organizations’ corporate governance. To 
study this, I use the Netherlands as a case study. 
The Dutch House of Representatives promoted a gender quota in 2009, after 
a period of social debate and pressures toward gender diversity in corporate 
positions. The Dutch quota has an enforcement mechanism that is different to the 
other gender quotas issued previously, such as the one in Norway. In particular, 
the Dutch quota imposes no penalizations on firms that did not follow the law. 
Conditional on this, Dutch firms react differently at their organizational level to the 
social pressure—that ends up in the quota—as few firms fulfill the regulation 
toward gender diversity. This heterogeneity in the compliance with regulations 
provides a setting where I can complement the findings of Hillman et al. [2007]. 
Using a sample of Dutch listed firms during the period 2003 - 2012 and the period 
2009 - 2012, I provide evidence that, consistent with the results in Hillman et al. 
[2007], observable organizational characteristics help predict the likelihood of 
including a female board member. Specifically, firm’s size, profitability and tenure 
of the board members are factors which are likely to influence the likelihood of 
including a female board member. 
Overall, my study contributes to the debate regarding the consequences of 
implementing affirmative actions to boost gender diversity in corporate 
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governance, in particular in environments with minimum costs for delinquent 
firms; my study also complements the findings of Hillman et al. [2007], as I 
provide evidence of determinants of including female board members in regulated 
settings, where social pressure toward gender diversity leads to affirmative action 
programs; and, finally, I provide evidence on the heterogeneity in the 
organizational response to the survival strategies described by the resource 
dependence approach and the institutional theory. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section two presents the literature 
review, hypothesis and describes the Dutch setting; Section three describes the 
sample and the research design; Section four presents univariate and multivariate 
results from the research design; Section five concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature review. Determinants of female presence in corporate 
governance in the Dutch case 
3.2.1 Literature review 
Organizations are assumed to generate two, not mutually exclusive, strategies for 
survival. The first strategy deals with internal processes inside the firm, in the 
sense that organizations should concentrate on improving the efficiency of internal 
transformation processes, so resources can be used as economically as possible and 
continuously exchanged. A second strategy is to guarantee favorable exchanges 
with external organizations, through political actions taken between the firm and 
those external organizations. These exchanges with external organizations provide 
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external resources. This view that firms depend on successful exchanges with 
external organizations through different channels is defined as the resource 
dependence approach (Pfeffer [1972]). 
Firms construct different links to obtain external resources. One particular 
connection between the firm and external organizations is the board of directors, 
which plays a central role in the process of guarantying access to external 
resources for the organization (Pfeffer [1973]; Dowling and Pfeffer [1975]). 
Traditionally, boards fulfill two different roles inside the firm: monitoring and 
advising. Through monitoring and advising, boards contribute to the mitigation of 
potential conflicts of interests between stakeholders. Complementary to these 
responsibilities, boards provide links to external resources due to the social capital 
of board members and board interlocking: the access to those external resources 
increase organizational legitimacy and reduce external dependence (Pfeffer and 
Salancik [2003]; Jensen and Zajac [2004]). However, as external or environmental 
dependencies change, so do the needs for specific resources and thus the need for 
specific types of directors (Hillman et al. [2000]; Hillman et al. [2007]). Hence, apart 
from the traditional benefits of boards—supervision and counsel—board members 
provide legitimacy to organizations. 
The legitimacy provided by board members is linked also to the 
institutional theory approach, which complements the resource dependence 
theory. Meyer and Rowan [1977] state that the success of an organization depends 
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upon other factors than efficiency in coordination and control of productive 
activities. Companies that work in highly elaborated institutional environments 
and succeed in becoming isomorphic with these environments gain the legitimacy 
and resources required for survival. Hence, a successful organization interacts with 
its environment, understanding, accepting and modifying the cultural and social 
components of an organization field, becoming isomorphic with it. Therefore, the 
firm can take advantage of the resources available, and, hence, fulfill its goals 
(Suchman [1995]; Luoma and Goodstein [1999]; Certo [2003]). 
However, two problems arise from this institutional perspective. First, 
isomorphism can confront efficiency, a conflict that erodes organizational survival. 
Second, as demands for organizational change come from different parts of the 
environment, they can contradict each other. Part of the solution for this problem is 
that the organization becomes itself an active part in the creation and 
dissemination of change. The organization may be forced to create an intermediate 
point between confronting beliefs, and, hence, to create new paradigms that can be 
taken as rules for the organizational field (Meyer and Rowan [1977]; Ashforth and 
Gibbs [1990]; Henisz and Zelner [2005]). 
As described in previous paragraphs, Pfeffer [1972] explains that business 
organizations use their boards of directors to coopt or absorb important external 
organizations, which are interdependent. This is achieved exchanging some degree 
of control and private information for continued support from external 
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organizations. That is, firms with larger capital requirements are more likely to 
reserve a greater percentage of their board to representatives from financial 
institutions. Firms may face a range of different resource constraints and associated 
demands for legitimacy, from regulation to public pressure toward desirable social 
outcomes, as, in the particular case of this study, granting gender balance on 
managerial and control positions. 
It is well documented the difficulties of women to reach top positions 
(Bilimoria and Piderit [1994]; Wennerås and Wold [1997]; Ellemers et al. [2004]; 
Westphal and Stern [2006]; Bornmann et al. [2007]; Westphal and Stern [2007]). 
However, the evidence regarding the effects of gender diversity on managerial and 
control positions seems inconclusive, due to different approaches to the solution of 
the gender underrepresentation problem (better governance mechanism or 
affirmative action programs). Also, methodological issues make it difficult to 
disentangle the endogenous relationship between firms characteristics and 
corporate governance (Hermalin and Weisbach [2001]; Adams et al. [2010]; Ferreira 
[2015]). 
Scholars have documented important differences between women and men 
performing managerial roles. Females tend to show a more employee-friendly 
behavior (Matsa and Miller [2014]), whereas they are more likely to reduce gender 
asymmetries on salaries inside the firm (Tate and Yang [2014]). Also, Barua et al. 
[2010] and Francis et al. [2014] provide evidence that female CFOs provide better 
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financial reporting quality. Regarding the effects of the presence of females on 
boards, association studies show that gender diverse boards are associated with 
better financial performance (Erhardt et al. [2003]). Also, Gul et al. [2011] provide 
evidence that large firms with gender-diverse boards are more transparent, as they 
increase public disclosure of firm-specific information. Regarding board members, 
Adams and Ferreira [2009] show that female board members attend more board 
meetings than their male counterparts, and that women are more likely to join 
monitoring committees. Also, these authors find evidence that the presence of 
female board members improve the meeting attendance of their male counterparts. 
In the other hand, Adams and Funk [2012] provide evidence that female board 
members are less risk averse than their male counterparts, providing arguments 
against the vision that women are more conservative in terms of financial risk, at 
least on the population of highly skilled workers. Regarding the supervisory role 
of boards, Srinidhi et al. [2011] and Abbott et al. [2012] show that firms with 
gender diverse boards are more likely to exhibit better financial reporting 
practices. Other scholars have an opposite view toward the inclusion of females in 
managerial roles. In particular, Ryan and Haslam [2005],[2007] provide evidence 
that females are more likely to be appointed in financially distressed firms, and the 
performance of these distressed firms get worse after the inclusion of these female 
managers. 
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Given the aforementioned evidence that the presence of female board 
members is associated with better organizational outcomes, and the perceived 
difficulties for females to reach top positions, social agents are increasingly 
pushing for the implementation of policies to foster female presence on boards, in 
particular affirmative action programs. However, the evidence regarding the 
effects and consequences of affirmative action programs is mixed. Some scholars 
believe that affirmative action programs lead to suboptimal solutions to 
contracting problems (Lundberg [1991];  Coate and Loury [1993])  Also, there is 
empirical evidence that quotas led to the hiring of less qualified candidates (Holzer 
and Neumark [1999a]). However, quotas positively affect the participation of 
women in politics (Beaman et al. [2009]) and in competitions (Balafoutas and Sutter 
[2012]). Quotas also have a positive effect over female education (Beaman et al. 
[2012]). 
Despite this mixed evidence about the effects of quotas, there is an 
increasing political pressure to include females on boards of directors. In 
particular, the European Union has a long tradition fostering gender balance in 
governance. The treaty of Rome in 1957 included a provision toward that end. The 
first recommendations issued by the European Union (EU) promoting balanced 
participation of men and women in the decision-making process date back to 
1984—ensure active participation by women in decision-making bodies—and 
1996—encourage the private sector to increase the presence of women at all levels 
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of decision-making. However, the responses to these initiatives were poor. In 2010, 
the EU adopted a strategy for equality between women and men for the next five 
years. One of the most controversial outcomes of this strategy was the proposed 
law to improve gender balance in Europe’s company boards by 2020. 
In addition to the EU regulations, many European countries have set 
regulations or recommendations. The most direct approach was implemented by 
Norway, through the imposition of a compulsory gender quota for corporate 
board seats. Issued as voluntary at the end of 2003, the Quota imposed a minimum 
40 percent representation of each gender on public firms. After voluntary 
compliance failed, a mandatory version was announced in 2005, becoming 
effective in 2006, with a two year transition. The penalty for delinquent firms was 
liquidation. The empirical evidence on the effects of the Norwegian quota offers 
evidence consistent with the quota having negative effects for Norwegian firms 
and their shareholders. In particular, Ahern and Dittmar [2012] show that there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of female board members and 
Norwegian firms Tobin’s Q; also, these authors find a negative market reaction for 
firms with no female board members at the moment of the informal announcement 
of the quota. 1  Also, Matsa and Miller [2013] provide evidence of a negative 
                                                          
1 On February 22nd, 2002, the Minister of Trade and Industry in Norway, Ansgar Gabrielsen, sent a 
message through the media that if Norwegian companies were not implement policies to revert the 
reduced gender diversity on their boards the Norwegian government was ready to implement 
radical actions to address this imbalance. The Norwegian Gender Quota became a law less than two 
years later. 
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relationship between Norwegian firms operating profits and the gender quota, 
through an increase of labor costs. These scholars link explicitly the gender of the 
new board members due to the Quota and the poorer firm performance. Finally, 
Bøhren and Staubo [2014] provide evidence that Norwegian firms switched legal 
status to avoid the quota. Regarding the effects of the quota over the career 
decisions of Norwegian females, Bertrand et al. [2014] provide evidence that 
Norwegian women do not change neither professional nor educational choices 
after the implementation of the quota. 
Following Norway, other countries as Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland 
and Italy have set quotas on boards in the recent years. Other countries like Spain 
offer economic incentives (e.g. preference for public contracts) to firms that achieve 
gender balanced boards. A particular case is the Netherlands, which passed a less 
stringent Gender Quota, which is the object of this study and that I comment in 
detail in following sections. 
3.2.2 Research question 
Hillman et al. [2007] argue that the main benefits of including females on boards 
are advice and counsel; communication, commitment and resources, and 
legitimacy. Regarding legitimacy, as aforementioned, it is conferred by societal 
members through the fulfillment of social demands. Societal members include a 
wide range of individuals and organizations, as politic parties, consumer 
organizations and other group of interests, even firms’ stakeholders. Legitimacy, 
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defined as a social judgement of acceptance, appropriateness and desirability, 
grant access to external resources deemed important for the survival of the 
organization. Legitimacy, associated with the society’s rules, norms and values, 
helps to alleviate firm’s informational asymmetries. For example, firm investment 
opportunities are associated with the expected return over investment (ROI). 
However, ROI is associated with risk, as the firm’s future is uncertain. However, 
legitimacy reduces this uncertainty as it signals investors that the firm fulfills 
society’s rules, norms and values, e.g. sound corporate governance practices 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz [2002]). In my setting, legitimacy is, at least partially, 
provided by societal members who push for gender diversity. However, 
organizational characteristics can affect the demand toward legitimacy provided 
by those social organizations. In particular, Hillman et al. [2007] provide evidence 
that a number of firm characteristics are associated with gender diversity on 
boards; these determinants of gender diversity on boards are linked to different 
levels of demand for legitimacy by organizations. However, the authors base their 
study on an unregulated setting, where the demand and supply of external 
legitimacy is different from a regulated environment. In particular, in countries 
where social pressure toward diversity is more stringent, this pressure can lead to 
affirmative action programs. 
Firms facing quotas suffer from a higher social and political pressure to 
increase gender diversity on boards than in unregulated environments. However, 
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the response to quotas can be heterogeneous, depending both on the punishment 
for delinquent firms and the enforcement of the quota (Becker [1974]). These 
factors (punishment and enforcement) are directly related the demand for 
legitimacy by the organization. As both punishment and enforcement are high, 
firms have to clearly fulfill social pressure, namely legitimacy, in order to survive. 
For example, the aforementioned Norwegian Gender Quota imposes an extreme 
punishment, namely liquidation of the firm. If enforcement is also high, firms must 
gain external legitimacy, namely fulfill the quota, to survive. However, if either the 
punishment or the enforcement are weak, firms may have different reactions 
toward the fulfillment of the quota. Hence, conditional on low punishment or low 
enforcement and despite the aforementioned social pressure to the mandatory 
inclusion of females on boards—exerted by quotas—some firms may even do not 
include any female board member, if their demand for external legitimacy is low. 
Hence, it can be inferred that the demand for external legitimacy to access outside 
resources is not constant among firms. I assume that the heterogeneity in the 
fulfillment of social pressure that leads, eventually, to affirmative action programs 
is associated with observable organizational characteristics. In the following 
paragraphs, I describe factors that drive heterogeneity on the demand for 
legitimacy on this particular setting. 
   Organizational size: larger and more visible organizations are more likely to 
suffer higher pressure to conform social expectations (Meyer and Rowan [1977]; 
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Demsetz and Lehn [1985]). Large companies are more visible, and are more easily 
identified by customers and regulators. In addition to the visibility of the firm 
associated with size, larger boards have on average more seats, making easier—or 
at least less costly—the inclusion of new board members. Hence, ceteris paribus, 
larger organizations are more likely to include women in their boards. 
H1: Larger organizations are more likely to include women in their boards. 
  Profitability: Pfeffer [1972] describes that firms depend upon two not 
mutually exclusive mechanisms for survival. One mechanism is the successful 
linkage with external organizations to draw resources from the environment 
through political action. The second mechanism is an efficient transformation of 
resources internally, used for exchange. As organizations become more successful 
in one of these mechanisms, it is more likely that they will depend upon less on the 
other one (Boeker and Goodstein [1991]). An alternative approach to this argument 
is that firms with higher legitimacy attract more resources, achieving higher 
profitability (Russo and Fouts [1997]; Zimmerman and Zeitz [2002]), or, 
conversely, more profitable firms are forced to increase its legitimacy (Boyd 
[1990]). Finally, scholars also provide evidence than females are more likely to be 
appointed to executive positions when the firm is suffering financial distress, a 
phenomenon label Glass Cliff (Ryan and Haslam [2005]; [2007]). Hence, firms doing 
poorly are more likely to demand external legitimacy as a substitution for poor 
performance. Conditional on these three arguments, I hypothesize that 
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organization’s profitability is related to the demand of legitimacy from outside 
organizations to survive. 
H2: The profitability of the firm, used as proxy for the level of resources generated 
internally, affects the inclusion of female board members. 
Tenure: Board members develop more human capital as long as they retain 
their positions, as these positions grant visibility and networking. Visibility and 
networking create human capital, valuable for economic agents (Simon and 
Warner [1992]). Also, board members with longer tenure are more likely to be 
appointed to key committees inside the firm (Kesner [1988]). Hence, long tenured 
board members are less likely to leave the board, independently of social pressure. 
However, Corporate Governance Codes (CGC) throughout Europe recommend 
that board members should only be on the same board position for a limited 
number of terms. Hence, after a number of terms, a current board member is likely 
to leave his/her position in the board, making easier the allocation of available 
seats to new female board members, gaining legitimacy. These two arguments run 
in different directions in terms of likelihood of the appointment of female board 
members. Hence, I state the hypothesis relating board tenure and likelihood 
without an ex ante direction: 
H3: The length of the tenure of the members of the board has an effect over the 
likelihood of incorporate female board members. 
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3.2.3 Research setting 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses I use as a setting the Netherlands, in a 
period characterized by an increasing social pressure toward gender diversity that 
end up in the issuing of a Gender Quota. The Dutch Gender Quota is an 
affirmative action passed by the House of Representatives in 2009. Contrary to 
more stringent Quotas (as in France, Germany, Italy or Norway), the Dutch Quota 
only imposes comply or explain type of penalty for delinquent firms.2 Hence, the 
enforcement of the quota is relatively low, whereas most pressures toward the 
fulfillment of the Quota come from social pressures. 
The Netherlands is one of the biggest and most dynamics economies of the 
Eurozone. By 2013, Dutch GDP per capita is 38,300€ (average EU – 28 countries 
26,600€), unemployment was 6.7 percent (10.8 percent) and female participation in 
the workforce is around 70 percent (Eurostat, 2014). 
Companies in the Netherlands follow a two-tier board system: boards are 
composed of an executive body and a supervisory body. The executive body is in 
charge of the daily management of the firm, whereas the supervisory body is in 
charge of supervising and advising the management board. Members of the 
executive team are full time employees of the firm, whereas members of the 
supervisory board are not full time employees, but they meet periodically to fulfill 
their duty (Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2009). This two-tier system is 
                                                          
2 “Comply or explain” means that the company needs to explain the reason for a breach and the 
actions it is undertaking to correct the imbalance in its annual report. 
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common around Europe: 10 out of 27 countries in the Union recommend in their 
Corporate Governance Code a two tier board system. 
Corporate governance in the Netherlands is regulated by the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code (CGC). The CGC contains best practices provisions 
and principles for a sound relationship between the executive board, the 
supervisory board and interested parties. This CGC was generated by the 
Monitoring Committee, which is also in charge of supervising the implementation 
of the good practices. The CGC is not a legal provision: it only provides guidelines 
for sound corporate governance. Nevertheless, over time, some provisions of the 
CGC became enforced by law. 
Regarding the inclusion of females on boards, the Monitoring Committee—
in charge of verifying the fulfillment of the CGC suggestions—included a gender 
diversity clause in the CGC in 2007. Before the 2009 law, gender diversity—on the 
supervisory board—was included as a suggestion in the item III.3.1 of the CGC, as 
“(…) promoting independent action of the supervisory board is to ensure the diversity of its 
composition in terms of such factors as age, gender, expertise, social background or 
nationality” (CGC, 2009, pp. 42). However, the Monitoring Committee highlighted 
both on its Annual Report 2011 and 2012 that gender diversity on supervisory 
boards has scarcely increased. Although an increased social and political pressure 
for gender diversity, and the slow rate of incorporation of females into the boards, 
the CGC does not include any specific target toward gender diversity. 
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In terms of public policy, on December 2009 the Dutch House of 
Representatives adopted a law requiring that at least 30 percent of the seats of the 
executive and the supervisory board should be occupied by members of each 
gender.3 This law—which was expected to be approved by June 2012—was fully 
adopted by the Dutch government in January 2013. Companies subject to this law 
that do not fulfill the 30 percent target should explain in the Annual Report why 
the seats are not evenly distributed, how the company has tried to balance the 
distribution of seats, and how the company seeks to achieve the balance of seats in 
the future. No further penalties are proposed. Moreover, the scope of the quota in 
terms of time is also limited: the law is expected to be derogated by January 2016. 
Contemporary to the adoption of the Dutch Quota, the European Union 
Commissioners proposed the aforementioned plan for gender balance in 
November 2012. The gender balance proposal requires reserving a minimum 40 
percent of the non-executive seats for each gender by 2020. This plan was formally 
approved by the European parliament in 2013, and in order to become a law, the 
proposal requires to be approved by the EU Member States in the Council. 
Dutch firms responded to this social pressure differently. The Dutch Female 
Board Index, collected yearly by Lückerath-Rovers since 2007 (when the possibility 
of a Dutch Gender Quota started to be discussed in political arenas), shows that by 
                                                          
3 The target provisions only apply to larger Ltds and PLCs. These are not subject to the proposed 
statutory provision, if they meet two of the following three requirements: a) the value of the assets 
according to its balance sheet does not exceed € 17.500.000; b) net sales for the financial year does 
not exceed € 35.000.000; c) the average number of employees for the financial year is less than 250. 
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of the executive and managerial board. As penalties for firms not fulfilling the 
Dutch Quota were weak (comply or explain type), compliance with the Quota was 
low. I define that a firm is responding—at least partially—to social pressure to gain 
legitimacy in this setting through the inclusion of at least a female board member. 
This assumption is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented by 
Lückerath-Rovers that, although the number of firms fulfilling the quota is low, 
Dutch firms with at least a female board member almost double between 2009 and 
2014. I will define this variable for two different sample periods: during the full 
time-span of my sample (2003 – 2012) and the post quota period (2009 – 2012). 
Given the nature of the boards in the Netherlands (a dual system, with executive 
and supervisory boards) I repeat the specification (1) for the presence of a female 
board member on either the executive or in the supervisory boards. Variablesi,t are 
the set of proxies for the determinants that I hypothesize have an effect over the 
likelihood of having a female on the board. To test hypothesis one I use as a proxy 
for size log of Total Assets (Peng [2004]). To test hypothesis two I include Returns 
over Assets (ROA) and Market Returns, defined as annual returns of holding a share 
of the target firm over a calendar year (Hillman et al. [2007]). Finally, to test 
hypothesis three I include Board Tenure (average tenure of the board members). 
Complementary to these variables, I use also as a proxy for visibility (and, 
therefore, a larger probability of including a female board member) a dummy 
variable taking value one for boards bigger than the median of Board Size (8 
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members) and, depending on the specification, the size of the executive or the 
supervisory board. I also include as a control Firm’s Age (to control for inertia, 
measured as the number of years that the firm appears in the sample) and MTB for 
the firm’s growing potential. Finally, I include the ratio between Cash Flow from 
Investment Activities and Total Assets, to control for investment complexity. 
3.3.2 Data 
The sample is composed of a varying number of listed Dutch firms for the period 
2003 to 2012. The total number of unique firms that appear in my sample is 102. 
However, the number of firms in my sample in a given year ranges from 53 firms 
in 2003 to 68 firms in 2006. Board data is obtained from the BoardEx database, 
whereas firms’ financial data comes from the Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database. 
The final sample is composed of 570 observations with both financial and board 
data.4 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of this study’s data. In terms of 
corporate governance variables, the average Dutch board is composed by 8.37 
members (median 8), whereas the smallest (biggest) board is composed by 3 (18) 
members. The average Executive Board is composed of 2.81 members (median 3) 
whereas the average Supervisory Board is composed by 5.55 members (median 5). 
                                                          
4 If I drop from my database firms fulfilling at least two of the conditions required for the quota 
waiver (firms with less than €17,500,000 in assets, net sales below €35,000,000 or less than 250 
employees), results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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The proportion of female board members on Dutch firms increases from 4 
percent in 2003 to 13 percent in 2012. This increment in the proportion of female 
board members is explained by the increment of the proportion of females on 
supervisory boards (from 5 percent in 2003 to 16 percent in 2012). On the contrary, 
the proportion of women on executive boards remains low (2 percent in 2003, 6 
percent in 2012). 
 
3.4 Determinants of having female board members 
3.4.1 Univariate tests 
Table 3.2 presents correlations between the variables in my study, whereas Table 
3.3.a and 3.3.b present results of univariate tests comparing firms with at least a 
female board member with firms with no female board members during the full 
sample (2003 – 2012) and the quota period (2009 – 2012), respectively. As predicted 
in hypothesis one, firms with a female board member are bigger in terms of both 
market capitalization and assets than firms with no female board members in both 
periods. Also, bigger firms—both measured by log of assets and log of market 
capitalization—are positively correlated with the number of seats available on 
boards, both at the Supervisory and Executive level. Firms with bigger supervisory 
and executive boards are more likely to include a female board member. 
Regarding hypothesis two, profitability also seems to be driving the likelihood of 
including a female board member on the board, as the ROA for these firms is 
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higher than for firms with no female board members, at least during the pre-quota 
period. However, this relationship is inverted in the post quota period, as firms 
with no females on boards are more profitable in terms of ROA. Overall, I interpret 
this result as evidence that there are observable factors driving the inclusion (or 
not) of women on Dutch boards. Regarding hypothesis three, average board 
members tenure seems to be similar on firms with and without female board 
members. 
3.4.2 Multivariate tests 
To test the determinants of having a female on board in the Dutch setting I use a 
standard logistic regression. As in Hillman et al. [2007], the use of a firm fixed 
effects approach is inappropriate for this setting, as many firms have either no 
women or systematically have females on the board for the entire period. Hence, I 
use a population-averaged logistic regression model with firms as the cross-
sectional units. In particular, I use a population-averaged model where the 
generalized estimating equation (GEE) adjusts for the correlation between 
independent variables and fixed effects. This estimation technique corrects for 
violations of the assumption that unobserved firm-specific random effects and 
fixed effects are uncorrelated (Jensen and Zajac [2004]; Hillman et al. [2007]). 
To make it easier the interpretation of my results, I report the odds ratios. 
Odds ratios represent a change in probabilities of a dependent variable related to 
changes in the independent variable. An independent variable with an odds ratio 
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higher than one indicates that this independent variable has a positive effect over 
the likelihood of the dependent variable. An independent variable with an odds 
ratio smaller than one indicates a negative relationship between the independent 
and the dependent variable. In this particular setting, an odds ratio higher than 
one implies higher likelihood of having a female on the board; an odds ratio 
smaller than one implies lower likelihood of having a female on the board. 
To test my hypotheses, I perform two different analyses. In the first set of 
tests I use the full sample, that is, all firms during the period 2003 - 2012. In the 
second set of tests I study the determinants during the period 2009 - 2012. Table 3.4 
presents the results for the full sample period (2003 - 2012). Column A presents the 
results for the general board. Hypothesis one—positive relationship between 
female presence on board and size—is verified, as the odds ratio for size is positive 
and significant (odds ratio = 1.408; p < 0.05). Regarding hypothesis two—the 
success in generating internal resources affects the likelihood of including a female 
board member—the odds ratio for ROA is higher than one and significant (odds 
ratio = 4.647; p < 0.05), implying that more successful firms in generating internal 
resources are more likely to include women on boards. Finally, the odds ratio of 
the variable average tenure does not provide evidence supporting hypothesis 
three—the tenure of board members is associated with the likelihood of the 
presence of at least a female board member—. Regarding the control variables, 
firm’s age is positive and significant (odds ratio = 1.150; p < 0.05). This implies that 
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older, well stablished firms are more likely to include females on its boards during 
that period. As the variables firm age and tenure can be collinear, I perform a 
Variance Inflation Factor test, reported in Table 3.5.  
Given that Dutch boards of directors follow a dual system, with an 
executive and a supervisory board, I test what drives the inclusion of female board 
members in either the boards during the period 2003 – 2012. These results are 
reported in columns B and C of Table 3.4, respectively. Regarding executive 
boards, the most important determinant in my sample is the size of the executive 
board (odds ratio = 2.262; p < 0.01). Contrary to the findings for the general board 
composition, a high ROA is not associated with the presence of female board 
members on executive boards. However, there is a significant and negative 
relationship between average tenure of executive board members (odds ratio = 
0.780; p < 0.1) and a positive and significant relationship between size of the 
executive board (odds ratio = 2.262; p < 0.01) with the likelihood of having a 
female on the executive board.  Regarding supervisory boards, the picture is more 
similar to the results from the general board. This similar picture between the 
general board and the supervisory board is associated with the aforementioned 
description that there is a higher proportion of supervisory female board members 
in Dutch companies; hence, it is more likely that if a woman is appointed to a 
board, she will be included in the supervisory board. 
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In the second set of test, I perform the same analysis as before, but only for 
the period 2009 – 2012, that is, the period when the gender quota was in place. The 
results for this specification are reported in Table 3.6. In terms of general board 
composition (column A), only the control variable firm age (odds ratio = 1.152; p < 
0.1) seems to affect the likelihood of having a female board member, supporting 
only hypothesis one. When I consider only the executive committee, results are 
more in line with my hypotheses. In particular, the size of the executive board 
affects positively the likelihood of having a female board member (odds ratio = 
3.313; p < 0.01). Also, the average tenure of the members of the executive board 
affects negatively the likelihood of having a woman sitting on the executive board 
(odds ratio = 0.742; p < 0.01). Regarding control variables, the odds ratio of the 
variable firm age indicates a positive effect over the likelihood of having a woman 
in the executive board (odds ratio = 0.748; p < 0.05). An interpretation of this result 
is that firms listed after the announcement of the Dutch Quota are more likely to 
include women on their boards. A high MTB is also positively related to the 
likelihood of having an executive female board member (odds ratio = 2.145; p < 
0.01). Regarding the supervisory boards (column C), as described before for 
general board composition, only the size of the board have a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood of including a female board member. 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter study how heterogeneity in the organizational response to increasing 
social pressure to foster gender diversity can be predicted using firm specific 
information. As organizations demand external resources from the environment as 
a survival strategy, these resources must be obtained through legitimacy from 
external organizations. I argue that under certain conditions (in environments with 
higher pressure for gender diversity) this legitimacy is achieved through the 
inclusion of females on boards. However, the observed heterogeneity in gender 
diversity at firm level in the Netherlands (a country that imposed, after a transition 
period, a quota with low enforcement) is associated to heterogeneity in the 
demand for external legitimacy. This posits the question of what factors drive these 
different reactions. I hypothesize that observable firm characteristics drive the 
demand for legitimacy and external resources. Consistent with the hypothesis one, 
large (and visible) firms are more likely to include female board members. This 
positive relationship between size and the presence of female board members can 
be linked to the fact that more visible firms are more likely to suffer from external 
pressure to fulfill demands for external legitimacy. Also, bigger firms have also 
bigger boards, making easier the inclusion of female board members. Hypothesis 
two states that the generation of internal resources by the organization is related to 
gender diversity on boards. I find a positive and significant relationship between 
return on assets and the likelihood of including a female board member. Finally, I 
test the relationship between board tenure and the likelihood of including a female 
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board member. Although the results from the general and supervisory boards are 
inconclusive, I find evidence that the tenure of the board members in executive 
boards is negatively associated with the likelihood of the presence of a female 
board member. 
I acknowledge that my research has several limitations. The size of the 
sample and the availability of data limit the tests that I can perform in this setting. 
In particular, I am unable to test two important determinants of female presence on 
boards. First, previous studies show that the proportion of females employed in 
the firm’s industry is positively associated with the likelihood of including female 
board members. Second, diversification strategy and competition are also factors 
that influence the likelihood of hiring female board members. 
Overall, my study provides evidence of the factors driving compliance with 
gender diversity regulations in environments where regulation is not stringent, 
and compliance is heterogeneous among firms. As more European countries are 
pushing toward actions to increase the presence of females on boards, this 
evidence is particularly important for regulators and policy makers to provide a 
better understanding of forces driving gender diversity within firms. 
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3.A Tables 
Table 3.1 – Descriptive statistics of variables included in the study. 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Market Capitalization 13.725 13.704 1.658 
Assets 14.129 14.099 1.585 
General Board Size 8.370 8 2.480 
Females on Boards (%) 5.487 0 7.995 
Firms with at least a 
female on Board (%) 
36.667 0 48.232 
Firm Age 7.149 8 2.287 
Executive Board Size 2.814 3 1.406 
Females on Executive 
Boards (%) 
2.491 0 8.738 
Supervisory Board Size 5.557 5 1.834 
Female on Supervisory 
Boards (%) 
6.541 0 10.189 
Tenure 5.375 5.1 2.743 
ROA (%) 5.229 4.98 10.624 
Returns (%) 13.983 9.176 55.659 
Scaled Cash Flow from 
investment activities 
-0.055 -0.047 0.147 
Scaled Research and 
Development Expenses 
0.0127 0 0.0319 
Market to Book ratio 1.037 0.695 1.205 
Observations 570   
Notes to Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the study. Market Capitalization is the 
ln of firm’s market capitalization; Assets is the ln of the book value of firm’s assets; General Board 
Size is the number of board members both from the Executive and Supervisory boards; Females on 
Boards (%) is the percentage of females sitting on both the executive and supervisory boards; Firms 
with a least a female on Board (%) is the percentage of firms with at least a female sitting on any of the 
boards (executive or supervisory); Firm Age is the number of years that a given firm appears in my 
sample; Executive Board Size is the number of members of the Executive Board; Females on Executive 
Boards (%) is the percentage of females sitting on Executive Boards; Supervisory Board Size is the 
number of members of the Supervisory Board; Females on Supervisory Boards (%) is the percentage of  
females sitting on Supervisory Boards; Tenure is the average time in years of the board members 
tenure; ROA is return over assets; Scaled Cash Flow from investment activities is the ratio between 
Cash Flow from investment activities and total assets; Scaled Research and Development Expenses is 
the ratio between Research and Development Expenses and total assets; Market to Book is the ratio 
between Market Capitalization over book value of assets. 
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Table 3.2 – Pairwise correlation between variables included in the study. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.Market 
Capitalization 
               
2.Assets 0.8075              
 
3.General Board 
Size 
0.5742 0.6059              
4.Percentage 
Female 
0.2721 0.2543 0.1357             
5.One Female on 
Board 
0.2960 0.2761 0.2551 0.9028            
6.Firm’s Age 0.2908 0.1888 0.0903 0.0811 0.1160          
 
7.Executive Board 
Size 
0.2476 0.2400 0.6821 0.0026 0.0930 0.0207          
8.Percentage 
Female on Executive 
Boards 
0.1128 0.1123 0.0951 0.4574 0.3750 -0.1020 0.1294         
9.Supervisory Board 
Size 
0.5877 0.6366 0.8279 0.1838 0.2749 0.1071 0.1548 0.0292        
10. Percentage 
Female on Sup. 
Boards 
0.2453 0.2169 0.1672 0.8888 0.8444 0.1213 0.0422 0.0573 0.1955       
11.Tenure 0.1718 0.0929 -0.1252 0.1192 0.0733 0.3415 -0.1088 -0.1561 -0.0822 0.1468      
12.ROA 0.2568 0.0001 0.0437 0.0984 0.0939 0.1501 0.0327 0.0100 0.0339 0.1037 0.1101     
13.Returns 0.1463 0.0070 0.0017 -0.0753 -0.0595 0.0031 -0.0391 -0.0813 0.0321 -0.0480 0.0081 0.1349    
14.Scaled CF from 
investment activities 
-0.0048 -0.0405 0.0505 0.0270 0.0377 0.1027 0.0211 -0.0599 0.0514 0.0798 -0.0155 0.0844 -0.0387   
15.Scaled R& D 
Expenses 
0.0132 -0.0952 0.1115 -0.0740 -0.0608 0.0379 0.0618 0.0976 0.1030 -0.1369 -0.0811 -0.1355 0.0276 -0.0294  
16.Market to Book 
ratio 
0.2021 -0.2629 0.0214 0.0079 0.0100 0.1212 0.0237 -0.0067 0.0104 0.0175 0.0736 0.4246 0.1256 0.2089 0.1670 
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Notes to Table 3.2: Correlations between variables included in the study. Market Capitalization is the ln of firm’s market capitalization; Assets is the ln 
of the book value of firm’s assets; General Board Size is the number of board members both from the Executive and Supervisory boards; Females on 
Boards (%) is the percentage of females sitting on both the executive and supervisory boards; Firms with a least a female on Board (%) is the 
percentage of firms with at least a female sitting on any of the boards (executive or supervisory); Firm Age is the number of years that a given firm 
appears in my sample; Executive Board Size is the number of members of the Executive Board; Females on Executive Boards (%) is the percentage of 
females sitting on Executive Boards; Supervisory Board Size is the number of members of the Supervisory Board; Females on Supervisory Boards (%) is 
the percentage of  females sitting on Supervisory Boards; Tenure is the average time in years of the board members tenure; ROA is return over 
assets; Scaled Cash Flow from investment activities is the ratio between Cash Flow from investment activities and total assets; Scaled Research and 
Development Expenses is the ratio between Research and Development Expenses and total assets; Market to Book is the ratio between Market 
Capitalization over book value of assets. 
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Table 3.3.a – Mean comparisons of variable in the study. Group variable: At least 
one female sitting on the general board. Period 2003 – 2012 (Full Sample) 
 
Variable At least one Female No Female Difference 
Market Capitalization 14.369 13.352 1.018* 
Assets 14.703 13.796 0.907* 
General Board Size 9.201 7.889 1.311* 
Executive Board Size 2.986 2.715 0.271* 
Supervisory Board Size 6.220 5.174 1.046* 
Tenure 5.640 5.223 0.417 
ROA 0.065 0.045 0.021* 
Returns 0.096 0.165 -0.068 
Cash Flow from 
investment activities 
-0.048 -0.060 0.011 
Research and 
Development Expenses 
0.010 0.014 0.004 
Market to Book ratio 1.052 1.027 0.025 
Observations 209 361  
Notes to Table 3.3.a: Univariate test for differences in firm characteristics for the period 2003-2012. 
Group variable: presence of at least a female on the executive or supervisory board of directors. 
Market Capitalization is the ln of firm’s market capitalization; Assets is the ln of the book value of 
firm’s assets; General Board Size is the number of board members both from the Executive and 
Supervisory boards; Executive Board Size is the number of members of the Executive Board; 
Supervisory Board Size is the number of members of the Supervisory Board; Tenure is the average 
time in years of the board members tenure; ROA is return over assets; Returns is the calendar return 
of investing one euro in the firm’s stock; Cash Flow from investment activities is the ratio between 
Cash Flow from investment activities and total assets; Scaled Research and Development Expenses is 
the ratio between Research and Development Expenses and total assets; Market to Book is the ratio 
between Market Capitalization and book value of assets. T-test assuming equal variance between 
groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3                                                             
 
 
 
143 
Table 3.3.b – Mean comparisons of variable in the study. Group variable: At 
least one female sitting on the general board. Period 2009 – 2012 (Post-quota 
announcement) 
 
Variable At least one Female No Female Difference 
 Market Capitalization 14.363 13.205 1.158* 
 Assets 14.753 13.821 0.932* 
General Board Size 9.385 7.292 2.093* 
Executive Board Size 3.156 2.226 0.930* 
Supervisory Board Size 6.229 5.066 1.163* 
Tenure 5.837 5.149 0.688 
ROA  0.049 0.036 0.012 
Returns  0.070 0.233 -0.155* 
Cash Flow from 
investment activities 
-0.057 -0.048 -0.009 
Research and 
Development Expenses 
0.016 0.010 0.005 
Market to Book ratio 0.953 0.892 0.062 
Observations 96 106  
Notes to Table 3.3.b: Univariate test for differences in firm characteristics for the period 2003-2012. 
Group variable: presence of at least a female on the executive or supervisory board of directors. 
Market Capitalization is the ln of firm’s market capitalization; Assets is the ln of the book value of 
firm’s assets; General Board Size is the number of board members both from the Executive and 
Supervisory boards; Executive Board Size is the number of members of the Executive Board; 
Supervisory Board Size is the number of members of the Supervisory Board; Tenure is the average 
time in years of the board members tenure; ROA is return over assets; Returns is the calendar return 
of investing one euro in the firm’s stock; Cash Flow from investment activities is the ratio between 
Cash Flow from investment activities and total assets; Scaled Research and Development Expenses is 
the ratio between Research and Development Expenses and total assets; Market to Book is the ratio 
between Market Capitalization and book value of assets. T-test assuming equal variance between 
groups. 
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Table 3.4 – Odds ratios from a fit-population averaged panel data model. 
Dependent variable: At least one female sitting on the board. Period 2003 – 2012 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 General Board Executive Board Supervisory Board 
Assets 
1.408** 
(0.206) 
1.288 
(0.369) 
1.404** 
(0.210) 
ROA 
4.647** 
(3.362) 
1.634 
(1.596) 
4.316* 
(3.371) 
Returns 
0.869 
(0.114) 
0.814 
(0.128) 
0.905 
(0.133) 
Investment 
1.009 
(0.362) 
0.369 
(0.391) 
0.966 
(0.293) 
Firm Age 
1.150** 
(0.080) 
0.639*** 
(0.098) 
1.207** 
(0.108) 
MTB 
0.971 
(0.089) 
1.042 
(0.375) 
1.042 
(0.076) 
General Board Size 
1.329 
(0.387) 
0.527 
(0.452) 
0.910 
(0.274) 
General Board Avg. 
Tenure 
0.931 
(0.051) 
  
Executive Board Size 
 2.262*** 
(0.633) 
 
Executive Board Avg. 
Tenure 
 0.780* 
(0.099) 
 
Supervisory Board Size 
  1.276* 
(0.178) 
Supervisory Board Avg. 
Tenure 
  0.908 
(0.062) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test 32.83 (0.01) 45.63 (0.00) 29.65 (0.04) 
Observations 570 570 570 
Notes to Table 3.4: Odds ratios from a fit-population averaged panel data model. Dependent variables are: 
General Board is a dummy variable taking value one if there is at least a female board member sitting in any of 
the two boards (executive or supervisory); Executive Board is a dummy variable taking value one if there is at 
least a female board member sitting in the executive board; Supervisory Board is a dummy variable taking value 
one if there is at least a female board member sitting in the supervisory board; Assets is the ln of book value of 
assets; ROA is return over assets; Returns is the return of investing one euro in the firm’s stock over a calendar 
year; Investment is the ratio between Cash Flow from investment activities and total assets; Firm Age is the 
number of years that the firm appears in the sample; MTB is the Market to Book value of the firm; General 
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Board Size is a dummy variable taking value one for firms with boards bigger than 8 members; General Board 
Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of members of the board; Executive Board Size is the number of members of 
the executive board; Executive Board Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of the members of the executive boards; 
Supervisory Board Size is the number of members of the supervisory board; Supervisory Board Avg. Tenure is the 
average tenure of the members of the supervisory board. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 3.5 – Reporting the Variance Inflation Factor 
of the model tested in Table 3.4 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 General Board Executive Board Supervisory Board 
Assets 1.61 1.60 2.14 
ROA 1.34 1.34 1.33 
Returns 1.54 1.56 1.54 
Investment 1.10 1.10 1.11 
Firm Age 1.26 1.16 1.24 
MTB 1.48 1.51 1.53 
General Board Size 1.44 1.73 1.91 
General Board Avg. 
Tenure 
1.19   
Executive Board Size  1.34  
Executive Board Avg. 
Tenure 
 1.10  
Supervisory Board Size   2.54 
Supervisory Board Avg. 
Tenure 
  1.16 
Notes to Table 3.5: Variance Inflation Factor of the dependent variables of the models tested in Table 3.4. 
Dependent variables are: General Board is a dummy variable taking value one if there is at least a female board 
member sitting in any of the two boards (executive or supervisory); Executive Board is a dummy variable taking 
value one if there is at least a female board member sitting in the executive board; Supervisory Board is a 
dummy variable taking value one if there is at least a female board member sitting in the supervisory board; 
Assets is the ln of book value of assets; ROA is return over assets; Returns is the return of investing one euro in 
the firm’s stock over a calendar year; Investment is the ratio between Cash Flow from investment activities and 
total assets; Firm Age is the number of years that the firm appears in the sample; MTB is the Market to Book 
value of the firm; General Board Size is a dummy variable taking value one for firms with boards bigger than 8 
members; General Board Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of members of the board; Executive Board Size is the 
number of members of the executive board; Executive Board Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of the members 
of the executive boards; Supervisory Board Size is the number of members of the supervisory board; Supervisory 
Board Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of the members of the supervisory board. 
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Table 3.6 – Odds ratios from a fit-population averaged panel data model. 
Dependent variable: At least one female sitting on the board. Period 2009 – 2012 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
 General Board Executive Board Supervisory Board 
Assets 
1.159 
(0.197) 
1.400 
(0.450) 
0.978 
(0.191) 
ROA 
0.831 
(0.883) 
0.178 
(0.226) 
1.280 
(1.239) 
Returns 
1.014 
(0.163) 
1.146 
(0.241) 
1.085 
(0.199) 
Investment 
0.850 
(0.433) 
3.224 
(2.670) 
1.039 
(0.428) 
Firm Age 
1.152* 
(0.095) 
0.748** 
(0.103) 
1.251** 
(0.139) 
MTB 
0.985 
(0.133) 
2.145*** 
(0.552) 
0.910 
(0.135) 
General Board Size 
2.314 
(1.436) 
1.597 
(0.943) 
0.949 
(0.578) 
General Board  Avg. 
Tenure 
0.971 
(0.055) 
  
Executive Board Size 
 3.313*** 
(1.111) 
 
Executive Board Avg. 
Tenure 
 0.742*** 
(0.072) 
 
Supervisory Board Size 
  1.479** 
(0.281) 
Supervisory Board Avg. 
Tenure 
  0.945 
(0.090) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test 19.32 (0.05) 35.12 (0.00) 21.89 (0.04) 
Observations 202 202 202 
Notes to Table 3.6: Odds ratios from a fit-population averaged panel data model. Dependent variables are: 
General Board is a dummy variable taking value one if there is at least a female board member sitting in any of 
the two boards (executive or supervisory); Executive Board is a dummy variable taking value one if there is at 
least a female board member sitting in the executive board; Supervisory Board is a dummy variable taking value 
one if there is at least a female board member sitting in the supervisory board; Assets is the ln of book value of 
assets; ROA is return over assets; Returns is the return of investing one euro in the firm’s stock over a calendar 
year; Investment is the ratio between Cash Flow from investment activities and total assets; Firm Age is the 
number of years that the firm appears in the sample; MTB is the Market to Book value of the firm; General 
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Board Size is a dummy variable taking value one for firms with boards bigger than 8 members; General Board 
Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of members of the board; Executive Board Size is the number of members of 
the executive board; Executive Board Avg. Tenure is the average tenure of the members of the executive boards; 
Supervisory Board Size is the number of members of the supervisory board; Supervisory Board Avg. Tenure is the 
average tenure of the members of the supervisory board. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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3.B Figures 
Figure 3.1: Proportion of Dutch firms with at least a female board member in the 
general board 
 
 
 
Notes to Figure 3.1: Proportion of Dutch firms with a female board member (executive and 
supervisory) in our sample. 
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